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DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AUDIT QUALITY 
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ABSTRACT 
The finance geography literature has provided evidence on the informational 
advantage possessed by local investors, analysts, investment banks, mutual fund 
managers, and market makers. The plausible explanations for the information advantage 
of local stakeholders are lower cost of information and better access to information. 
Geographical advantages may apply in the audit market as well. In this study, I 
investigate factors that determine a firm's choice of a local or non-local auditor. I also 
extend prior studies of the consequence of auditor-client distance on audit quality by 
using going concern report accuracy and the likelihood of financial restatements. 
Based on the assumption that firms prefer high audit quality at an affordable audit . 
fee, I hypothesize that there are three main reasons that may explain why clients choose 
non-local auditors. First, the availability of local auditors may be limited. Second, local 
auditors may be unwilling to accept risky clients or may charge an unacceptably high risk 
premium. Third, non-local auditors may charge lower audit fees compared to local 
auditors with the same level of audit quality. 
17 percent (11,016 firm years) of my sample of firms from 2000-2012 engage 
non-local auditors. My results suggest that the availability of local Big 4 auditors and 
Vll 
auditors with industry specialization lowers the likelihood of firms hiring non-local 
auditors. Loss firms, firms receiving going concern audit reports, firms with lower 
profitability, and firms with internal control problems are more likely to engage non-local 
auditors. Collectively, the evidence suggests that firms with high audit risk are more 
likely to hire non-local auditors. Lastly, I observe that non-local auditors' fees are higher 
than local auditors' fees. This suggests that firms fail to lower audit fees by hiring non-
local auditors. One possible explanation is that non-local auditors charge higher fees to 
compensate for risks arising from information asymmetry between a non-local auditor 
and the client. 
There is some evidence indicating that local auditors have higher audit quality. 
Financial statements audited by local auditors are less likely to be restated. While local 
auditors are less likely to issue a going concern opinion, their going concern reports 
better predict firms' bankruptcy within a 2-year timespan. 
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AUDITOR-CLIENT DISTANCE: 
DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AUDIT QUALITY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Auditors spend most of their time at their client's site because most of the audit 
work needs to be performed or is better performed at clients' sites. A local auditor-client 
relationship should incur a lower travelling cost and time compared, to a distance auditor-
client relationship. In addition, the finance literature has developed a line of research in 
distance lending and investing (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 2002; Coval and Moskowitz 
1999; Coval and Moskowitz 2001). These studies argue that local lenders and investors 
enjoy benefits from local lending and investing due to an information advantage which 
comes from improving monitoring capabilities, observing soft information about firms, 
obtaining information at a lower cost, or gaining an access to private information. If the 
benefits from locality can be applied in the audit market, both firms and auditors should 
prefer a local auditor-client relationship rather than a distance relationship. However, a 
significant number of firms engage non-local auditor. The high incidence generates the 
question: what are the factors that determine a firm's choice of a local or non-local 
auditor? 
In the accounting literature, there are two studies that look into the relationship 
between auditor-client distance and audit quality, Jensen et al. (2013) and Choi et al. 
(2012). Both studies use the absolute value of performance-matched (ROA) discretionary 
accruals as a proxy for audit quality and find a negative relationship between audit-client 
distance and audit quality. They conclude that local auditors provide higher audit quality 
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than non-local auditors because local auditors have information advantage over non-local 
auditors. 
Based on the rationale that firms maximize audit value by hiring high quality 
auditors at an affordable audit fee, I hypothesize that there are three main reasons that 
may explain why clients choose non-local auditors. First, the number of local auditors 
may be limited. Second, local auditors may be unwilling to accept risky clients or may 
charge an unacceptably high risk premium. Audit risk model defines audit risk as a 
combination of inherent risk, control risk, and detection risk. This prediction relies on 
two assumptions. First, firms' financial reporting risk is associated with high audit risk 
and auditors charge higher audit fees to compensate for such risk. Second, local auditors 
have information advantage to evaluate the risk while non-local auditors fail to realize 
such risk or underestimate expected future losses due to such risk. The third reason why 
firms may choose non-local auditor is that non-local auditors may charge lower audit fees 
compared to local auditors with the same level of audit quality. 
The next question regarding the proximity of auditors and clients is the effect of 
the auditor-client distance on audit quality. Finance studies argue that local lenders and 
investors enjoy benefits from local lending and investing. Drawing from the finance 
literature, auditor-client distance can affect audit quality in three ways. First, auditors 
may have an information advantage related to the entity's business and its management 
by being local auditors and observing private information that cannot be obtained by 
being afar. Second, local auditors may incur lower costs and effort of obtaining 
information about firms. As a result, at the same level of audit fees and expected profits, 
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local auditors may be able to obtain more information about firms than non-local 
auditors. Third, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) indicate that one source of information 
advantage of being local investors is having close personal ties with local executives. 
However, the relationship between the firm and its auditor differs from the 
relationship between the firm and its investors, creditors, or analysts and may affect how 
auditors use the information and how distance may affect audit quality. Unlike investors 
or analysts, auditors have access to non-publicly available information about firms. Such 
information may replace the information locally available for local investors or auditors. 
The auditor independence is an important factor affecting audit quality. If local auditors 
enjoy information advantage about firms by having close personal ties with firms' 
executives, there can be a concern about auditors' independence. Close relationship can 
impair audit independence and lower the probability of reporting the breach in the 
client's accounting system. In addition, substantive tests and analytical procedures may 
allow auditors to express an appropriate opinion while using less only-locally-available 
information. 
I extend previous studies by developing a model to identify factors that relate to 
local and non-local auditor-client relationship, and investigating the relationship between 
auditor-client distance and audit quality by using going concern report accuracy and 
subsequent financial restatement incidents as proxies for audit quality. I choose going 
concern report accuracy as a measure of audit quality in this study because of two 
reasons. First, as indicated in Defond et al. (2011), auditors have direct control over their 
audit opinion, as opposed to indirect control over client discretionary accruals. Auditors 
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have no grounds to force clients to adjust accruals if clients do not violate GAAP. 
Second, in the context of auditor-client distance, I believe that information advantage of 
being a local auditor plays an important role in evaluating overall firms' future 
performance in case of uncertainty of firms' ability to continue. The decision about 
issuing going concern audit report is subjective and related to soft information. 
I choose the incidence of financial restatement as another proxy for audit quality 
because of two reasons. First, DeAngelo (1981) defines the quality of audit services as 
the joint probability that an auditor discovers a breach in the client's accounting system, 
and reports the breach. Auditors are responsible for rendering an opinion whether the 
financial statements are free from material misstatements. Accounting restatement is 
clear evidence of audit failure to detect and/or report material misstatements in financial 
statements. Second, various types of financial restatements may shed some light on 
particular types of accounts that are likely to be affected by audit-client distance. 
I find that the availability of local Big 4 auditors and auditors with industry 
specialization lowers the likelihood of firms hiring non-local auditors. Loss firms, firms 
received going concern audit reports, firms with lower profitability, and firms with 
internal control problems are more likely to engage non-local auditors. Collectively, the 
evidence suggests that firms with high audit risk are more likely to hire non-local 
auditors. Lastly, I find that non-local audit fee levels are higher than local audit fee levels. 
This implies that firms fail to lower audit fees by hiring non-local auditors. It is possible 
that non-local auditors charge higher fees to compensate for risks arising from 
information asymmetry between non-local auditors and client. 
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For control variables, large firms and firms with higher proportion of institutional 
investors are more likely to hire local auditors. Big 4 auditors are more likely to have 
local clients. The finding can be interpreted that firms engaging with non-local auditors 
do not seek higher quality auditors that are not available locally, Big 4 auditors may be 
unwilling to accept non-local clients, or Big 4 auditors with many local offices have 
broad geographically coverage. 
In the additional tests for Big 4 and non-Big 4 sample, I find that the availability 
of local auditors is negatively associated with the likelihood of non-local auditor-client 
relationship for both Big 4 and non-Big 4 sample. However, financial risks become less 
important for Big 4 sample. Loss firms are more likely to hire non-local Big 4, while 
other factors, leverage, previous year going concern opinion, ROA, and previous year 
internal control weakness, are not significant associated with the likelihood of non-local 
auditor-client relationship. For non-Big 4 sample, the results are the same as in the full 
sample. Financial risks are important factors determining the likelihood of non-local 
auditor-client relationship. Risky firms are more likely to hire non-local non-Big 4 
auditors. Non-local Big 4 auditors charge higher audit fees compared to local Big 4 
auditors. However, there is no significant difference in audit fee for local and non-local 
non-Big 4 auditors. 
There is some evidence indicating that local auditors have higher audit quality. 
Financial statements audited by local auditors are less likely to be restated. While local 
auditors are less likely to issue a going concern opinion, their going concern reports 
better predict firms' bankruptcy within a 2 year timespan. The subsample tests for Big 4 
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and non-Big 4 shows that there is no significant difference in audit quality for local and 
non-local Big 4 auditors. The findings suggest that Big 4 auditors can control audit 
quality across all distances or the local information advantage is not important for them to 
maintain audit quality. Within the non-local sample, firms that hire non-local auditors 
while there are local auditors available, and firms that hire non-local auditors who are 
very far away from them are more likely to have misstatement. 
This paper contributes to our understanding of audit quality, auditor choice, and 
auditor portfolio management. It adds to the literature in the investigation of audit-client 
distance, determinants of auditor choices in term of local and non-local auditors, and 
auditors' client acceptance criteria. This paper also provides evidence on Big 4 audit 
quality when they have to perform audit service outside their local cities. Overall, this 
paper tries to shed light on local audit market in response to the concern about audit 
market concentration as evidence in Government Accountability Office (GAO) report to 
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House 
Committee on Financial Services (2003) and GAO Report to Congressional Addressees 
(2008). In addition, Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB) Standing Advisory 
Group Meeting on Audit Quality Indicators (2013) indicates the proximity of the partner 
and the client as one of the indicators for audit quality, but this area is still underexplored. 
The findings in this paper may provide audit firms useful information on the decision to 
accept non-local clients. Firms may use information from this paper to make decision 
about hiring new auditors from local and non-local cities. Investors may use the results to 
evaluate the quality of local and non-local auditors. Regulators may use the information 
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to form policies on audit quality and to provide support for small audit firms to grow and 
to cope with audit market concentration. If we know that distance does not affect audit 
quality, the PCAOB can encourage distance hiring and lower the problem of market 
concentration. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Factors that determine a firm's choice of a local or non-local auditor 
The auditor appointment decision is a joint decision between clients and auditors. 
There are two main factors firms consider when choosing auditors; audit quality and 
audit fee. Firms benefit from auditors ' work in many ways. During the audit and review 
process, auditors may discover accounting mistakes or ineffectiveness of internal control. 
Firms will be able to correct such mistakes before issuing financial statements or to 
improve internal control procedures that can prevent future mistakes. Previous studies 
indicate that high quality auditors, as proxied by Big 4 auditors or auditors with industry 
expertise, provide higher quality financial reporting (e.g. Becker et al. 1998). Hiring 
auditors with good reputation can signal stakeholders that the firms intend to provide 
high quality financial statements and lessen information asymmetry between firms' 
managements and investors. 
For auditors, the main consideration when accepting a client is expected profit. 
Audit fees are comprised of production costs, expected present value of future losses, and 
profit (Simunic 1980; Menon and Williams 2001). Production costs include the audit 
team's time and effort spent on the engagement. Future losses can come from payments 
due to lawsuits, lost profits from current and future clients due to reputational damage, 
7 
and fines and penalties substandard practices. According to the Auditing Standard No. 8 
(PCAOB 2010), "the objective of the auditor is to conduct the audit of financial 
statements in a manner that reduces audit risk to an appropriately low level." The 
Standard defines audit risk as "the risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit 
opinion when the financial statements are materially misstated." The Standard further 
explains that audit risk is a function of the risk of material misstatement, which consists 
of inherent risk and control risk, and detection risk. Auditors cannot control, but need to 
assess the level of material misstatement risk in order to determine the appropriate level 
of detection risk. The level of detection risk will then determine the amount of 
substantive procedures auditors need to perform, which will affect audit team's time and 
effort spending in the engagement. An inaccurate assessment of the level of material 
misstatement risk can result in increased audit risk and future losses, decreased profit, or 
losing clients due to charging too high on audit fee. Auditors may decline risky clients 
because they cannot accurately assess material misstatement risk; or the auditors may 
charge high audit fees to compensate such risk. 
Auditing Standard No. 5 classifies audit procedures into risk assessment 
procedures and further audit procedures, which consist of tests of controls and 
substantive procedures. The Standard also provides specific descriptions of audit 
procedures for obtaining audit evidence. These procedures include inspection, 
observation, inquiry, confirmation, recalculation, reperformance, and analytical 
procedures. With communication technology, some procedures can be done from afar 
such as sending bank confirmations or performing analytical review. However, a majority 
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of audit works still need to be done at clients' sites. For example, the Standard describes 
observation as "Observation consists of looking at a process or procedure being 
performed by others." As a result, auditors spend most of their time at their client's sites. 
A local auditor-client relationship should incur a lower travelling cost and time compared 
to a non-local auditor-client relationship. Clients have to reimburse their auditors' out of 
pocket travelling costs. Total audit costs of hiring non-local auditors should be higher 
than the costs of hiring local auditors. Therefore, assuming that local and non-local 
auditors provide the same level of audit quality, firms should prefer local auditors rather 
than non-local auditors. 
The finance literature has developed a line of research in distance lending and 
investing (e.g. Petersen and Rajan 2002; Coval and Moskowitz 1999; Coval and 
Moskowitz 2001). Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find that home bias exists within the 
U.S. border among fund managers investing primarily in U.S. equities in the year 1995. 
Fund managers prefer local firms, in particular, small, highly levered firms that produce 
goods for domestic sales. They interpret the results as local fund managers having 
information advantage with respect these firms. They further explain that the information 
advantage of being local investors may come from the easier access to information about 
local firms. Local fund managers can talk to employees, managers, suppliers of the firms , 
get information from local media, and have close personal ties with locai executives. 
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that, on average, fund managers earn additional 2.67 
percent of annualized monthly raw excess returns from local investments relative to non-
local investments during the sample period of 1975- 1994. In particular, gains from local 
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investments are larger for small funds with few holdings since they are more likely to 
better monitor local information, older funds that may have well established community 
ties, and funds in remote areas where there are few competitors and investment 
community ties are strong. In addition, local stocks avoided by local fund managers 
underperform local stocks held by local fund managers. The authors explain their 
findings are due to fund managers having information advantage that may come from 
improved monitoring capabilities or access to private local information that cannot be 
obtained from afar. 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that the distance between small firms and their 
lenders is increasing. Their explanation for their findings is that advances in technology 
and communications allow lenders to obtain more timely hard information about 
borrowers' creditworthiness. Lenders can provide distance lending knowing that they can 
intervene quickly if borrowers show sign of troubles. Stein (2002) argues that small 
business lending relies heavily on soft information, which is information that cannot be 
directly verified by anyone other than the agent who produces it. Overall, these studies 
argue that local lenders and investors enjoy benefits from local lending and investing due 
to information advantage which comes from improving monitoring capabilities, 
observing soft information about firms, obtaining information at a lower cost, or gaining 
an access to private information. However, in some cases, the information advantage of 
being a local lender or investor can be replaced by advances in technology and 
communications. 
Gaspar and Massa (2007) and Chhaochharia et al. (2012) provide evidence of a 
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positive relationship between the stake of local owners and the quality of corporate 
governance. Anand et al. (2011) show that market makers that are located closer to the 
firm headquarters contribute more to the price discovery of the firm's stock than more 
distant market makers. Similar to other studies, the results in their paper indicate superior 
information for local stakeholders, in this case, market makers. Similarly, Malloy (2005) 
provide evidence that local analysts are more accurate than other analysts due to 
information advantage. If the benefits from locality can be applied in audit market, both 
firms and auditors should prefer a local auditor-client relationship rather than a distance 
relationship. The majority of my sample (83 percent) consists of local auditor-client 
relationship. However, a significant number of observations (17 percent, 11,016 firm-
years) engage non-local auditor. The incident generates a question, what are factors that 
determine a firm's choice of a local or non-local auditor? 
Jensen et al. (2013) and Choi et al. (2012) develop an auditor-choice model in an 
attempt to control for auditor choice in their main test of audit quality. They identify 
firms that are more likely to hire non-local auditors as firms that are smaller, locate in 
rural areas, have fewer available auditors and fewer available Big 4 auditors, have a 
lower ROA, have a higher proportion of intangible assets to total assets, report a loss, 
report an internal control weakness under SOX Section 302, have a lower percentage of 
institutional ownership, and receive a modified going concern opinion. Jensen et al. 
(2013) acknowledge the low explanatory power of the model (adjust R2 = 4.03%) and 
hesitate to strictly interpret their result and emphasize that the purpose of the model is 
merely to control for self-selection in the main analysis. Choi et al.(2012) model has a 
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pseudo-R2 of 17.46. I extend their models by adding variables based on finance 
geographic information asymmetry theory, and accounting theory that may affect auditor 
choices. 
i. The availability of local auditors 
The public and regulators have had a great concern about audit market 
concentration and competition after the dissolution of Arthur Andersen in 2002 and the 
decrease in the number of large public accounting firms to four (the Big 4). To cope with 
accounting scandals, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) restricts accounting firms from 
providing certain non-audit services to their audit clients. The restrictions further limit 
auditor choices among large firms because they cannot hire a Big 4 as their auditor if they 
hire that Big 4 for other non-audit services. In the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) Report to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the 
House Committee on Financial Services (2003), GAO indicated that "Mergers among the 
largest firms in the 1980s and 1990s and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen in 2002 
significantly increased concentration among the largest firms, known as the "Big 4". 
These four firms currently audit over 78 percent of all U.S. public companies and 99 
percent of all public company sales. This consolidation and the resulting concentration 
have raised a number of concerns." In GAO Report to Congressional Addressees (2008), 
the same concern was still there as it indicated that "The small number of large 
international accounting firms performing audits of almost all large public companies 
raises interest in potential effects on competition and the choices available to large 
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compames needing an auditor." The same concern was mentioned in varwus news 
articles (Dwyer 2003, McKenna 2010, Lagace 2013). GAO conducted studies on public 
accounting firms market and found that 82 percent of the Fortune 1000 firms saw their 
choice of auditor as limited to three or fewer firms (GAO 2008). 
Auditing Standard No. 9 states that "The auditor should determine whether 
specialized skill or knowledge is needed to perform appropriate risk assessments, plan or 
perform audit procedures, or evaluate audit results." The Standard allows the audit 
partner to hire persons with specialized skill or knowledge, but the partner should have 
sufficient knowledge to evaluate the results of that specialist's procedures and the effects 
on the auditor's report. If local auditors with such skill or know ledge are not available, 
firms have to hire non-local auditors. 
The accounting literature provides evidence of a positive relationship between 
auditor industry specialization and audit quality. Romanus et al. (2008) document that 
employing an auditor with industry specialization is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of accounting restatement. They also find that employing an auditor with 
industry expertise decreases the likelihood of core accounting restatement. Changing 
from a non-specialist auditor to a specialist auditor increases the likelihood of 
restatement. They conclude that industry specialization enhances auditors' role m 
improving quality of financial reporting. Bloomfield and Shackman (2008) also find a 
negative association between audit firm industry specialization and restatement. Owhoso 
et al. (2002) report better performance of auditors when they work in the industry that 
they are experts. However, Minutti-Meza (2013) provides an alternative explanation for 
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the positive relationship between auditor industry specialization and audit quality. After 
controlling for the differences in characteristics of specialist and nonspecialist auditor 
clients, he cannot find the difference between specialist and nonspecialist audit quality. 
Maletta and Wright (1996) study accounting errors in regulated and non-regulated 
industries. They find significant differences in financial statement error characteristics 
across industries. In addition, they document differences in methods to detect such errors. 
Auditors should have appropriate audit strategies for a specific industry. Industry 
specialized auditors are more likely to detect errors that are particular for such industries 
than non-specialized auditors. 
Although the evidence on the positive relationship between auditor industry 
specialization and audit quality is not inclusive, firms may still prefer industry specialized 
auditors. If firms cannot find such auditors locally, firms may search for non-local 
auditors with such specialization. 
Based on the assumption that firms prefer high audit quality at an affordable audit 
fee, my first hypothesis is: 
Hl: The likelihood that a firm will engage a non-local auditor decreases with the 
availability of local auditors. 
ii. The client reporting risk 
Local auditors may be unwilling to accept risky clients or may charge an 
unacceptably high risk premium. Johnstone and Bedard (2004) study a large audit firm's 
portfolio management decisions and find that the audit firm dropped riskier clients in its 
portfolio and replaced them with less risky clients than its continuing clients. Audit risk 
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model defines audit risk as a combination of inherent risk, control risk, and detection risk. 
Auditors of firms with high inherent risk and control risk can maintain audit risk at an 
acceptable level by putting more effort in the engagement to lower detection risk. Local 
auditors may not accept firms with high financial reporting risk or charge very high risk 
premium. This prediction relies on two assumptions. First, firms' financial reporting risk 
is associated with high audit risk and auditors charge higher audit fees to compensate for 
such risk. Second, local auditors have information advantage to evaluate the risk while 
non-local auditors fail to realize such risk or underestimate expected future losses due to 
such risk. 
Based on the assumption that firms prefer high audit quality at an affordable audit 
fee, my second hypothesis is: 
H2: The likelihood that a firm will engage a non-local auditor increases with the 
firm's reporting risk. 
iii. Audit fees 
Non-local auditors may charge lower audit fees compared to local auditors with 
the same level of audit quality. Audit fees are comprised of production costs, expected 
present value of future litigation losses, and profit (Simunic 1980; Menon and Williams 
2001). Intuitively, the auditor-client distance should increase with audit fees. Travelling 
costs and time which are a part of production costs should be lower for local auditors. In 
addition, local auditors may incur lower information asymmetry costs and lower costs to 
perform audit tasks. Lower information asymmetry between local auditors and their 
clients may lower the likelihood of litigation and expected future losses from lawsuits 
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and reputational damage. As a result, local auditors should be able to charge a lower fee 
compared to non-local auditors giving the same profit. In addition, non-local audit fees 
may be higher than local audit fees due to adverse selection. Non-local auditors with high 
information asymmetry assume that non-local clients are risky clients because they were 
rejected by local auditors who have better information to evaluate the clients. As a result, 
non-local auditors should charge higher audit fees to compensate for such risks. 
However, it is possible that the non-local auditor is more efficient than local auditors and 
incurs lower production costs. In addition, auditors with access to private information 
may be able to lessen information asymmetry between the auditors and clients. Non-local 
auditors may be willing to have a lower profit compared to local auditors. Related to the 
previous hypothesis, non-local auditors may fail to realize such risk or underestimate 
expected future losses due to such risk. Altogether, firms may pay lower total audit 
expenses by hiring non-local auditors. 
In sum, there are reasons to expect that non-local auditors will charge a lower fee 
and also that non-local auditors will charge a lower fee. Based on the assumption that 
firms prefer high audit quality at an affordable audit fee, I state my third hypothesis as 
follows: 
H3: The likelihood that a firm will engage a non-local auditor decreases with audit 
fee. 
2.2 The effect of auditor-client distance on audit quality 
Drawing from the finance literature, auditor-client distance can affect audit 
quality in three ways. First, auditors may have an information advantage related to the 
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entity's business and its management by being local auditors and observing private 
information that cannot be obtained by being afar. This information is more likely to be 
soft information. For example, local auditors and clients' managers, creditors, customers, 
and suppliers may attend the same local meetings, go to the same gym, or join the same 
club. Local auditors may have better opportunities to converse with these people and 
learn about the managers' ethics and the relationship between the firms and their 
stakeholders. Such knowledge may help the auditors to better evaluate the likelihood of 
effectively implementing turnaround plans while assessing the firm's going concern 
status. In addition, management's integrity is an important factor in control environment, 
which is one of the five components of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 
the Treadway Commission (COSO) internal control framework. Audit risk is a 
combination of control risk, inherent risk, and detection risk. Auditors manage audit risk 
by evaluating clients' control risk and inherent risk, and then finding detection risk. The 
detection risk will determine the amount of substantive testing the auditors have to do. 
Having a more accurate evaluation of clients' control risk can help auditors better plan 
for substantive tests. As a result, it may help prevent subsequent financial statements. 
Second, local auditors may incur lower costs and effort on obtaining information 
about firms. In this case, local information is hard information and non-local auditors can 
obtain such information in the same way the local auditors do. However, cost or effort 
spent in obtaining the information is higher for non-local auditors. For example, local 
auditors read local newspapers and watch local news channels in their daily life, and in 
this process can get information about clients. In addition, for clients conducting local 
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business, information from local news can help auditors evaluate clients' business plans 
and assumptions. Non-local auditors can access to such information as well; however, at 
a higher price or effort. As a result, at the same level of audit fees and expected profits, 
local auditors may be able to obtain more information about firms than non-local 
auditors. However, advances in technology and communication systems may provide 
non-local auditors with lower cost of information. In addition, if local auditors have 
information advantage due to obtaining information at a lower cost, non-local auditors 
who can charge higher audit fees, which are enough to cover the additional cost of 
obtaining local information, should be able to provide audit quality at the same level as 
local auditors. Local auditors may have higher monitoring capability probably by having 
lower cost of performing audit tasks. Local auditors are more likely to incur lower 
travelling costs to clients which means the auditors may have more frequent visits to the 
clients than non-local auditors and may spend more time at clients than non-local 
auditors, given the same level of audit fee and profit from the engagements. The accuracy 
of going concern reports and the probability of detecting the misstatement can relate to 
the time and effort auditors spend at clients. 
Third, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) indicate that one source of information 
advantage of being a local investor is having close personal ties with local executives. If 
local auditors enjoy information advantage about firms by having close personal ties with 
firms' executives, there can be a concern about auditors' independence. DeAngelo (1981) 
defines the quality of audit services as the joint probability that an auditor discovers a 
breach in the client's accounting system, and reports the breach. Local information 
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advantage may increase the probability that an auditor discovers a breach in the clients' 
accounting system, however, personal ties with the client's managements can impair 
audit independence and reduce the probability that the auditor will reports the breach. 
This study considers the effect of audit-client distance on the likelihood of issuing 
going concern audit report and its accuracy. Both Type I (entities received going concern 
audit report but do not bankrupt) and Type II (entities went bankrupt without prior going 
concern audit report) errors are investigated. 
In accounting literature, there are two studies that investigate the relationship 
between auditor-client distance and audit quality, Jensen et al. (2013) and Choi et al. 
(2012). The Jensen et al. (2013) sample contains 18,762 firm-year observations from 
4,237 distinct firms from the year 2000 to 2006. The authors indicate three sources of 
information advantages obtained by local economic agents: better monitoring 
capabilities, lower monitoring costs, and increased availability of soft information. The 
main purpose of the study is to investigate the distance-related information advantages 
due to the availability of soft information. The authors believe that auditors' monitoring 
efforts are likely to be the same across similar clients regardless of geographic proximity. 
In addition, they believe that there is no significant financial incentive for auditors to 
provide different level of efforts to clients located in different geographic proximities 
because auditors are compensated for their work and out-of-pocket monitoring costs. 
They use the absolute value of performance-matched (ROA) discretionary accruals as a 
proxy for audit quality and find a negative relationship between audit-client distance and 
audit quality. Therefore, they conclude that the observed distance-related information 
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advantages are due to the availability of soft information. The rank-transformed value of 
the physical distance between the firm and its auditor is the variable of interest in their 
study. They indicate that they replace the rank-transformed value with the square root and 
natural logarithm of the physical distance between the firm and its auditor, and a dummy 
variable cut off at the physical distance equals 100 miles and get similar results. 
Similar to Jensen et al. (2013), Choi et al. (2012) use the absolute value of 
performance-matched (ROA) discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality and find 
a negative relationship between audit-client distance and audit quality. Their sample 
consists of all firms in the Audit Analytics database from the years 2002- 2005. Choi et 
al. (2012) identify a local auditor-client relationship as the engagement with the auditor's 
office and the client's headquarters are in the same Metropolitan Statistical Areas or 
located within 100 kilometers apart. 
Defond et al. (2011) recognize the effect of audit-client distance on audit quality 
' from Choi et al. (2012) study and put auditor-client distance in a sensitivity analysis in a 
model predicting likelihood of issuing going concern reports from auditors, in which the 
client's distance from SEC offices is the main variable of interest. The study does not 
specify the effect of auditor-client distance in the model. They find that non-Big 4 
auditors are less likely to issue a going concern report to their financially distressed 
clients when their offices are further away from an SEC regional office. They argue that 
auditors who are closer to an SEC office are better informed about SEC enforcement, 
more aware of consequences of providing low audit quality, and more aware of 
heightened scrutiny by SEC. As a result, auditors who are closer to an SEC office have 
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higher incentive to withstand client pressure to issue a clean opinion. Kedia and Rajgopal 
(2008) investigate the incidence of misreporting and SEC geography and argue that 
counties with close to SEC offices are less likely to misreport. They explain with two 
reasons. First, firms that are closer to SEC offices have a better chance to learn more 
about SEC policing function by social, civic, or business interacting with SEC 
enforcement officials or by observing SEC investigations of other firms in the 
neighborhood. Second, firms perceive that SEC with constrained time, effort, and budget 
is more likely to investigate firms that locate closer to the SEC. As a result, firms that are 
closer to the SEC, aware of high risk of investigation, lower their intensity of 
misreporting. They also report that SEC is indeed more likely to investigate firms with 
closer proximity from SEC's offices. 
Overall, local auditors may have information advantage which comes from 
improving monitoring capabilities, observing soft information about firms, obtaining 
information at a lower cost, or gaining an access to private information. In addition, local 
auditors may incur lower cost of performing audit tasks. On the other hand, close 
relationship between auditors and firms' managements may impair auditors' 
independence. If being local auditors relates to information advantage, firms should be 
more likely to hire local auditors and auditors should accept more local clients than non-
local clients. In addition, auditors should charge higher audit fees for non-local clients 
compared to local clients. Moreover, we should observe a negative relationship between 
auditor-client distance and audit quality. If, however, the local relationship between 
auditors and clients impair audit independence or there are factors that mitigate 
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information advantage by being local auditors, we should observe a significant difference 
in audit quality provided by local and non-local auditors but in an opposite direction. The 
distance between auditors and their clients can result in both positive and negative effect 
on audit quality. Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) find that the audit tenure is negatively 
associated with repmt failures. In addition, Carcello and Nagy (2004) find that fraudulent 
is more likely to occur during the first three years of auditor-client relationship. Audit 
partner rotation is a part of auditor independence as indicated in PUBLIC LAW 107-204 
(2002) Title 2 Section 203. The previous evidence may suggest that audit independence 
concerns do not lower audit quality. Together with evidence in the previously mentioned 
accounting and finance literature, I believe that the positive effect should dominate the 
negative effect. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H4: The distance between auditors and clients is negatively associated with audit 
quality, other things being equal. 
i. The incidence of restatements 
Audit Analytics reports increasing numbers of restatements from 577 firms in the 
year 2001 to 1,566 firms in 2006. The numbers starts to drop in year 2007 (Audit 
Analytics 2011). Accounting restatement harms investors' wealth. Palmrose et al. (2004) 
report abnormal return -9% over 2-day restatement announcement window. In a more 
recent study by Hennes et al. (2008), restatements because of irregularities result in 
cumulative abnormal returns at -13.64% while restatements because of errors result in 
cumulative abnormal return of -1.93%. Another study by Hranaiova and Byers (2007) 
from Public Company Accounting Oversight Board reports negative impact of 
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unfavorable restatement decreases substantially (71%) after Sarbanes-Oxley era. 
However, there are still negative market reactions to accounting restatements. Accounting 
restatements have impact not only to the restatement firms but also other firms that share 
directors with income-decreasing restatement firms (Srinivasan 2005). Restatements can 
result in managements and director turnover (Srinivasan 2005, Desai et al. 2006, Audit 
Analytics 2011). 
I choose the incidence of financial restatement as another proxy for audit quality 
because of two reasons. First, DeAngelo (1981) defines the quality of audit services as 
the joint probability that an auditor discovers a breach in the client's accounting system, 
and reports the breach. Auditors are responsible for rendering an opinion whether the 
financial statements are free from material misstatements. Accounting restatement is 
clear evidence of audit failure to detect and/or report material misstatements in financial 
statements. Second, various types of financial restatements may shed some light on 
particular types of accounts that are likely to be affected by audit-client distance. If local 
auditors have information advantage and have better monitoring capabilities compare to 
non-local auditors, financial statements audited by local auditors should contain fewer 
misstatements and therefore, less likely to be restated. My hypothesis on the distance 
between auditors and clients and the likelihood of restatement is: 
H4a: The distance between auditors and clients is positively associated with the 
likelihood of restatement, other things being equal. 
ii. Going Concern report accuracy 
I choose going concern report accuracy as a measure of audit quality in this study 
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because of two reasons. First, as indicated in Defond et al. (2011), auditors have direct 
control over their audit opinion, as opposed to indirect control over client discretionary 
accruals. Auditors have no ground to force clients to adjust accruals if clients do not 
violate GAAP. Second, in the context of auditor-client distance, I believe that 
information advantage of being a local auditor plays an important role in evaluate overall 
firms' future performance in case of uncertainty of firms' ability to continue. AU Section 
341: The Auditor's Consideration of an Entity's Ability to Continue as a Going Concern 
provides guidance to the auditor to evaluate whether there is a substantial doubt about the 
entity's ability to continue as a going concern for one year beyond the date of financial 
statements. If the auditor has substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a 
going concern, the auditor should obtain information about management's plans and 
assess the likelihood of effectively implementation of the plan. The guidance also 
indicates "The auditor's consideration should be based on knowledge of the entity, its 
business, and its management..." I believe that measuring audit quality by using the 
accuracy of going concern reports is a direct way to investigate the effect of audit-client 
distance on audit quality because the main argument of local auditor advantage is 
information advantage, especially soft information. The decision about issuing going 
concern audit report is subjective and related to soft information. 
Geiger and Rama (2006) analyze companies that receive going-concern audit 
reports during the years 1990 and 2000 and find that Big 4 auditors provide higher going 
concern reporting accuracy than non-Big 4 auditors. They test for both Type I and Type 
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ll errors. They find no significant difference m going-concern reporting accuracy 
between second-tier and third-tier auditors. 
Going-concern report prompts negative reaction from investors especially 
institutional investors (Menon and Williams 2010). Previous studies indicate an increase 
in audit switching after issuing going concern reports. When auditors issue going concern 
report, auditors face an economic tradeoff between losing the clients, and reputation and 
litigation damage (Reynolds and Francis 2000). Going concern reports can be used as 
legal protection for auditors. Buslepp and Victoravich (2012) argue that a low quality 
audit firm should be more likely to issue a going concern report than a high quality audit 
firm. They explain that a going concern report can provide an auditor with legal 
protection against low quality audit. 
There are two reasons why local auditors may issue going concern reports with 
lower Type I error compare to non-local auditors. First, as discussed above, local auditors 
have information advantage over non-local auditors, which allows them to provide going 
concern reports with higher accuracy. Second, local auditors are less likely to issue going 
concern reports to distressed clients due to close relationship between auditors and 
clients. This will increase Type ll error instead. The only reason why local auditors may 
issue going concern reports with higher Type I error compare to non-local auditors is that 
local auditors are more conservative than non-local auditors. The explanation for such 
behavior is that local auditors may view Type ll error as more severely damaging to their 
reputation. Local auditors with higher incentive to provide higher audit quality in their 
local areas where they have more clients. Local auditors do not want to lose other local 
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clients in case of Type II error occurs. The reciprocal arguments can be made in case of 
Type II error. My hypotheses on the distance between auditors and clients and the going 
concern report accuracy are: 
H4b: The distance between auditors and clients is positively associated with the 
likelihood of issuing a going concern report with Type I error, other things being 
equal. 
H4c: The distance between auditors and clients is positively associated with the 
likelihood of issuing a going concern report with Type II error, other things being 
equal. 
3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Sample and data sources 
The initial sample for this study consists of 217,974 audit opinions submitted during 
2000 to 2012, drawn from the Audit Analytics database, which provides the city-office of 
the auditor who signed the opinion. I delete firm-year data with missing city-office 
information, that are not on Compustat, that have a business address or auditor city-office 
outside the U.S., or that have missing audit fee and other require data for the basic 
location model, or firms that are located outside MSAs. My final sample consists of 
65,525 firm-years. 
[Table 1 Panel A] 
I classify auditor-client relationships as local if both the auditor and its client are in 
the same city or the same Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), or if the 
distance between the client and the auditor is less than 100 miles. The information on 
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MSA cities is from United States Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce updated 
in February 2013. The definition of MSAs from the Office of Management and Budget, 
Executive Office of the President (OMB, 2013) is "Metropolitan (Micropolitan) 
Statistical Areas have at least one urbanized area of 50,000 ( 1 0,000) or more population, 
plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the 
core as measured by commuting ties." There are 917 MSAs (381 Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas and 536 Micropolitan Statistical Areas) which include 1,808 counties (out of a total 
of 3,143 counties in the U.S.) For the sample firms that cannot be assigned to any MSA 
and sample firms for which the auditor is not in the same MSA, I use driving distance by 
Google Maps between the auditor's city and the client's city. I obtain address data from 
Audit Analytics, supplemented by Compustat. 
[Table 1 Panel B and C] 
In Table 1, Panel B, 16.81 percent (11,016) of 65,525 firm-year observations have 
non-local auditor-client relationship. The percentage of non-local relationship increases 
from 15.20 percent in 2000 to 19.06 percent in 2012. In Panel C, the increasing 
percentage in non-local auditor-client relationship is driven by the non-Big 4 sample, 
while the percentage for the Big 4 sample decreases. The percentage of non-local 
relationship for the non-Big 4 sample increases from 24.43 percent in 2000 to 32.10 
percent in 2012. The percentage of non-local relationship for the Big 4 sample decreases 
from 13.50 percent in 2000 to 10.68 percent in 2012. From this table, Big 4 auditors are 
more likely to have local clients compared to non-Big 4 auditors. 
[Table 1 Panel D] 
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In Panel D, each industry has a different proportion of local and non-local 
observations. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting has 39.24% of non-local 
auditor-client relationship, while the Transportation and Warehousing industry has 3.88% 
of non-local auditor-client relationship. 
[Table 1 Panel E] 
In Table 1, Panel E, numbers of auditor offices are decreasing over the 12 year 
period from 1,695 offices in 2000 to 1,017 offices in 2012. The significant event is the 
closing of Arthur Andersen after Enron scandal in 2001. Arthur Andersen surrendered its 
CPA license and its right to practice to the SEC on August 31, 2002. I track down the 
clients of Atthur Andersen after the year 2002 and find that 1 ,4 78 firms (out of the total 
of 1,778) go to another local auditor. 1,.643 firms hire another Big 4 auditor. 
Sources of other information used in this study are listed as following: 
• Financial information and segment information from Compustat database 
• Restatement, going concern opinion, SOX302 and SOX404 information from 
Audit Analytics database 
• Bankruptcy information from SDC Platinum database and Bankruptcy Yearbook 
and Almanac 
• Delisting information from CRSP database 
• Independent director information from Risk Metrics database 
• Institutional ownership information from Thomson Reuters database 
• Data for the bank fee model from Bank Regulatory database 
• Restatement prompters from GAO website 
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3.2 Prediction model for local and non-local auditor-client relationship 
The model for local and non-local auditor choice as modified from Jensen et al. 
(2013) and Choi et al. (2012) and based on the hypothesis development section is as 
following: 
NonLocal = ~0+~1numBign_MSA + ~2NumnonBign_MSA + ~3NumExp_MSA + 
~~everage + ~sLoss+ ~6GoingConcem + ~7ROA + ~sSOX302 + ~9Nafeeratio + 
~uA.uditfee +~nBigN + ~n Officenatexp + ~nlnstOwner + ~ulndepentDT + ~15size + 
~65BookMK+ ~nnumsegment + ~Jsnumfrgnseg + ~1J'rgnsegrev +Industry and year 
dummies+ e 
The model event is the likelihood of non-local auditor-client relationship. I cluster 
standard error by company for all location models except when the sample includes only 
unique firms. 
NonLocal is the auditor-client distance relationship and the variable of interest. 
NonLocal is equal to 0 if both the auditor and its client are in the same city, the same 
MSA, or the distance between them are less than 100 miles; 1 otherwise. Jensen et al. 
(2013) use normal transformed variable from distance between the city of the firm's 
headquarters and the city of auditor engagement office as an independent variable. In this 
study, I use a dummy variable indicating local and non-local relationship. I believe that 
dummy variable is more appropriated in this study because I expect no significant 
difference among samples with non-local relationship. I expect the information advantage 
by being local auditors does not change based on the distance of auditor-client once the 
relationship is not local. Either the auditors are 150 miles away or 300 miles away from 
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their clients, they cannot get information that requires locally observation. However, in 
the additional test section, I use the distance in miles as the dependent variable. 
I measure the availability of local auditors in three ways. nurnBigN_MSA is the 
number of Big 4 auditors in the MSA, NurnnonBigN _MSA is the number of auditors in 
the MSA, and NurnExp_MSA is the number of top ten auditor office industry 
specialization at national level in the MSA. There are two main reasons why firms prefer 
Big 4 auditors. First, for large firms, there can be that only Big 4 firms, with resources 
and offices all over the country, are capable of performing audit tasks. Second, Big 4 
auditors are perceived to have higher audit quality. Many studies indicate that Big 4 
auditors provide higher audit quality than non-Big 4 auditors. Pittman and Fortin (2004) 
report young firms that retain Big Six auditors to lower monitoring costs have lower 
borrowing costs. Two main hypotheses that explain the finding are deep pocket 
(litigation) hypothesis and reputation hypothesis. Under deep pocket or litigation 
hypothesis, Big 4 auditors are more likely to be the target of lawsuits. Under reputation 
hypothesis, Big 4 auditors have more to lose if they have reputational damage. Therefore, 
they have high incentive to provide high audit quality that can lower litigation risk and 
the likelihood of reputational damage. Higher audit quality leads to higher reporting 
quality and lower information asymmetry between investors or creditors and the firms. 
Some creditors put a restriction on firms to hire only Big 4 auditors. 
In the areas where there are not all Big 4 available, large firms and smaller firms that 
seek high audit quality by Big 4 are more likely to go outside their local area to find 
another Big 4. Therefore, I predict that number of Big 4 auditors in the MSA should have 
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a negative relationship with the likelihood of non-local auditor-client engagement. I also 
predict the same direction for number of auditors in the MSA as for number of Big 4 in 
the MSA. The availability of local auditors will affect small and medium firms' 
likelihood to hire non-local auditors. 
Firms may hire non-local auditors because local auditors may be unwilling to accept 
the client or may charge an unacceptably high risk premium. The main factor that 
discourages an auditor from accepting a client is risk. When clients go bankrupt, 
investors may sue auditors to compensate for losses sustained if the financial statements 
contain misstatements. Investors view auditors as insurance providers in case of 
investment losses due to financial statement misrepresentations (Menon and Williams 
1994). I use leverage, as measured by total liabilities divided by total assets as one of the 
proxies for firms' reporting risk. Other measures for risk include Loss, equal to 1 if the 
firm report a loss in the previous year; zero otherwise. GoingConcern is equal 1 if the 
previous audit opinion is going concern opinion; zero otherwise. Jensen et al. (2013) put 
ROA into the prediction model to capture managerial incentives to increase information 
asymmetry by hiring non-local auditors; the expected sign of ROA is positive. I argue 
that ROA can be an inverse indicator for bankruptcy risk. I measure ROA as net income 
over total assets. If local auditors are not willing to accept clients because of risk and the 
clients have to hire non-local auditors, the coefficients of risk factors should be positive 
except for ROA. 
SOX302 is equal to 1 if the firm reports internal control weaknesses under SOX 
Section 302; zero otherwise. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 Section 302 requires signing 
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officers to evaluate disclosure control and procedures within the previous ninety days and 
to report on their findings. Internal control is an important part of control risk, which 
affects audit risk. Good internal control can prevent and detect errors in financial 
reporting system before such errors go to final financial reports. Since audit risk is a 
combination of control risk, inherent risk, and detection risk, control risk increases audit 
risk. When firms report problem in their internal control structure, auditors can view this 
as a red flag for control risk. To maintain acceptable level of audit risk while control risk 
increases, auditors have to lower detection risk. Auditors may lower detection risk by 
performing more substantive test and more extensive analysis or lower level of material 
misstatement. Auditors may have to spend more time at clients' sites when firms report 
internal control problems. SOX Section 302 is mandated in the year 2002. Since my 
sample includes observations with a fiscal year end from 2000, some observations do not 
have the SOX Section 302 report. I assign SOX302 = 0 for these observations. In the 
additional test section, I exclude observations with a fiscal year end before 2004. 
Lastly, firms may hire non-local auditors because non-local auditors may charge 
lower audit fees compared to local auditors with the same level of audit quality. Auditfee 
is the ratio of total audit fees over total assets. If the firms seek lower fees charged by 
non-local auditors, the coefficient of Auditfee should be negative. I also put Nafeeratio in 
the model to capture the significance of the non-audit service. Nafeeratio is measured as 
total non-audit service fees over total audit fees. Some firms may hire non-local auditor 
because of the non-audit services. 
Control variables include BigN, Officenatexp, InstOwner, IndepentDT, Size, Bookmk, 
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Numsegment, Numfrgnseg, Frgnsegrev. BigN is equal to 1 if the auditor is Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KPMG, or Arthur Andersen. 
Officenatexp is equal to 1 if the auditor city office has the highest total audit fees across 
the nation for the NAICS 2-digit industry in the year; zero otherwise. Francis et al.(2005) 
provides Big 5 auditors ranking in 63 industries. The fifth ranked auditors in all industries 
have less than 15 percent of market share with an average of 5 percent. For city-industry 
combinations, they find that the top-ranked auditor has an average market share of 69 
percent, while the second-ranked firm has an average market share of 23 percent. These 
percentages support the concern of market concentration especially for large firms that 
prefer only a Big 4 auditor. Some complex industry need audit expertise in performing 
high quality audit. If there are few or none of local industry specialized auditors, firms 
may seek non-local industry expertise outside their local area. These two variables are 
related to the availability of industry expertise auditors in the local geographic area. The 
predicted sign for these two variables should be positive. However, since the Big 4 
auditors have offices around the country and the Big 4 auditors are industry expertise, the 
sign can be negative. Big 4 auditors are less likely to have non-local clients because their 
many local offices have enough geographic coverage for local clients. 
Size is measured as log total assets. Choi et al. (2012) argue that firm size should 
have a negative relationship with the likelihood of non-local auditor-client relationship 
because auditors are less likely to turn down large clients in the same locale. However, 
Jensen et al. (2013) put natural log of total assets in their model to control for general 
information asymmetry surrounding a company. They cite Coval and Moskowitz (1999), 
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Malloy (2005), and Hong et al. (2000), which provide evidence of small firms facing 
greater information asymmetries and have lower quality information environments than 
large firms. If auditors believe that large firms have lower information asymmetry 
surrounding a company, they may be willing to accept non-local large firms. I do not 
predict the sign for Size. 
InstOwner is a natural log of percentage of institution ownership plus 1. IndepentDT 
is the proportion of independent directors to the total number of directors of the firm. 
These variables are proxies for the level of corporate governance. Choi et al. (2012) argue 
that the percentage of institution ownership should have a negative relationship with the 
likelihood of non-local auditor-client relationship because institutional investors demand 
higher corporate monitoring. Jensen et al. (2013) use the same variable to control for the 
firm's need to employ high quality auditors. Their argument is based on the assumption 
that institutional investors believe that local auditors provide higher monitoring and audit 
quality. 
BookMK is firm's book value over firm's market value. I put this variable in the 
model to control for the firm's growth opportunities. Firms with higher growth 
opportunities may have higher private information available locally. 
PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 9 indicates that "the auditor should determine the 
extent to which audit procedures should be performed at selected locations or business 
units to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to obtain reasonable assurance about 
whether the consolidated financial statements are free ofmaterial misstatement". One of 
the factors that the auditor should consider is "The materiality of the location or business 
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unit". I use Numsegment, measured by the numbers of geographical segments, 
Numfrgnseg, measured by the numbers of foreign segments, and Frgnsegre, measured by 
revenue from foreign segment, as proxies for the importance information advantage 
obtained by locating near firms' headquarters. Auditor-client distances are measure as the 
distance between auditors' address and firms' headquarters with the assumption that 
firms' headquarters are the center of information. However, when firms operate in many 
geographical areas, the information about the segments may be lower at firms' 
headquarters and information advantage by being local auditors may lessen. Both firms 
and auditors may be indifferent in local and non-local relationship. The coefficients of 
these variables may not be significant different from zero. 
3.3 Likelihood of restatement 
Lawrence et al. (20 11) argue that the differences in audit quality between Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 come from the client characteristics. Once they control for the differences in 
client characteristics by using propensity score-matched samples for Big 4 and non-Big 4 
clients, they find no significant difference in discretionary accruals, cost of equity capital, 
and analyst forecast accuracy between Big 4 and non-Big 4 sample. Following their 
suggestion, I create a balanced sample of local and non-local observations using 0.01 
caliper propensity score matching based on the basic model determining the likelihood of 
local and non-local auditor-client relationship for all audit quality tests. I use 0.05 caliper 
for Type II error test due to a small sample size. In the robustness test section, I provide 
results for full model. I test the hypotheses using the following logistic regression model. 
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Restatement = ~o + ~1Local + ~2Size + ~3Leverage + ~~ookmk + ~5ROA + 
~Jnstowner + ~7/ndepentdt + ~sBigN + ~90/ficenatexp + e 
Restatement is equal to 1 if the firm has one restatement notification or more; zero 
otherwise. Restatement is measured in two ways. First, misstatement is equal to 1 if the 
audited financial statements are restated after the issuance. Second, restatement is equal 
to 1 if there is a restatement during the current year. I delete restatement category 40-
"Retrospective revisions to prior year financials for consistency." This categorization 
identifies restatements that have been made to previous years' financial numbers to make 
them consistent with the later year numbers. 
On February 7th, 2005, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a 
clarification regarding FASB Statement 13, which relates to operating leases. The 
clarification causes more than 285 lease-related restatements (Usvyatsky 2013). I 
identify 6 restatement subcategories (from a total of 71 subcategories) from Audit 
Analytics database that are related to lease accounting. However, none of the final sample 
is the restatement due to these 6 categories only. 
Prior studies (Kinney and McDaniel 1989, Defond and Jiambalvo 1991, Romanus et 
al. 2008) find that firm size is negatively related to the likelihood of restatement. Larger 
firms tend to have a better internal control than smaller firms. As a result larger firms 
have a lower likelihood of restatement. Size is natural log of total assets of the firm plus 
1. Shankar et al. (2009) report a positive and significant relationship between firm 
leverage and multiple restatement announcements. High leverage firms are associated 
with a higher likelihood of restatement (Kinney and McDaniel 1989, Defond and 
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Jiambalvo 1991, Romanus et al. 2008). The reason is that these firms are more likely to 
have debt covenant agreements. Violating the agreement will severely harm the firms and 
can put the firms into a bankruptcy. Therefore, these firms have an incentive to overstate 
their performance or financial position. Once there is no within-GAAP alternatives, these 
firms can go further and create misstatements. As a. result, they tend to have a financial 
restatement. Richardson et al. (2002) find some evidence of debt covenants as a 
motivation for aggressive accounting policy. In the model, Leverage is total liabilities 
divided by total assets. 
Firms with a significant difference between book and market values are firms that 
investors have high expectation about profitability. In particular, higher of market values 
over book values. Firms that are under such pressure have high likelihood to manage 
earnings upward to meet the expectation. Richardson et al. (2002) find that restatements 
firms are firms with higher market multiples. Bookmk is the book to market ratio equals 
to the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. The market value is 
calculated by multiplied number of outstanding common shares by closing price at the 
fiscal year end from Compustat. If the information is missing, I use market value from 
Audit Analytics. 
The management compensation is tied to firm profitability. As a result, the managers 
have an incentive to report a higher profit. The managers in firms with lower profitability 
are more likely to overstate profit. Kinney and McDaniel (1989) find that 60 percent of 
firms that correct previously reported quarterly earnings have profitability below industry 
median (net income/revenue and net income/equity). I expect firms with a lower 
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profitability to have a higher likelihood of financial restatement. ROA is return on assets 
as measured by net income divided by total assets. 
Velury et al. (2003) argue that institutional investors have an incentive and ability to 
monitor corporate managers because financial reporting from the managers affects stock 
prices and thus the investors' wealth. In addition, institutional investors have a better 
ability to analyze information from financial statements and have the voting power to 
control the managers. Overall, firms with institution owners tend to be under a better 
monitoring process. Moreover, these firms tend to be larger firms with more analysts 
following and more media coverage. Control environment is an important factor to 
prevent and detect accounting errors before they show up in financial statements. As a 
result, I expect to see firms with higher percentage of institution ownership to have better 
corporate governances and results in lower possibility of restatements. Instowner is a 
natural log of percentage of institution ownership plus 1. The independent director is 
another component in corporate governance. Abbott et al. (2004) find a significant 
negative relationship between the independence of audit committee and the occurrence of 
restatement. Indepentdt is the proportion of independent directors to the total number of 
directors of the firm. 
Some studies do not find significant association between Big 4 auditor and audit 
quality. Bauwhede et al. (2003) study Belgium firms and find no evidence of association 
between Big 6 auditor and earning management in samples of firms that smooth income 
upwards. However, they find evidence that a Big 6 auditor acts as a constraint in earning 
management in samples of firms that smooth income downwards. They explain the 
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results as an effect of legal environment that auditors have almost no risk of stockholder 
litigation while auditors concern about taxation authorities. Bloomfield and Shackman 
(2008) find a strong positive association between Big 5 auditor and restatement. They 
also find that auditor characteristics have much stronger explanatory power than total 
audit fee and total non-audit service fee. Although the evidence is not conclusive, there 
is more evidence supporting higher audit quality fot Big 4 auditor. BigN is equal to 1 if 
the auditor is Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KPMG, or Arthur 
Andersen. I expect BigN to have a negative relationship with the occurrence of a 
misstatement (or a subsequent restatement), but to increase the likelihood of detecting 
misstatements in prior financial statements audited by other auditors. 
Romanus et al. (2008) document that employing an auditor with industry 
specialization is negatively associated with the likelihood of accounting restatement. 
They also find that the auditor with industry expertise decreases the likelihood of core 
accounting restatement. They conclude that industry specialization enhances auditors' 
role in improving quality of financial reporting. Bloomfield and Shackman (2008) also 
find a negative association between audit firm industry specialization and restatement. 
Owhoso et al. (2002) report better performance of auditors when they work in the 
industry that they are experts. Maletta and Wright (1996) study accounting errors in 
regulated and non-regulated industries. They find significant differences in financial 
statement error characteristics across industries. In addition, they document . differences in 
methods to detect such errors. Auditors should have appropriate audit strategies for 
specific industry. Industry specialized auditors are more likely to detect errors that 
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particular for such industry than non-specialized auditors and prevent misstatements. 
However, industry specialists should have a higher ability to detect misstatements in prior 
financial statements audited by other auditors. 
3.4 Likelihood of issuing going concern audit report 
I create a balance sample of local and non-local observations using 0.01 caliper 
propensity score matching based on the basic model determining the likelihood of local 
and non-local auditor-client relationship. I modified models predicting a going concern 
report from Callaghan et al. (2009) and Francis and Yu (2009). The model is: 
Going_concern = Bo + B1Local + B2Zscore + B3Loss + B~everage + BsMkcap + 
B6Cash + B1Currentrt + BsROA + B9REVT + B1oOANCF + BnBigN +BnOfficenatexp + 
e 
Going_concern = 1 if the firm receive modified going concern opinion from its 
auditor; 0 otherwise. CurrentRT is current ratio as calculated by total current assets over 
total current liabilities. Revt is revenue. Oancf if cash flow from operating activities. All 
other variables are defined in previous sections. 
The purpose of testing this model is to verify the validity of the assumption that 
firms prefer high audit quality at an affordable audit fee when there can be a doubt that 
firms may prefer non-local auditors because non-local auditors provide more favorable 
audit opinions. 
3.5 Likelihood of issuing going concern report with Type I error 
I modified the Geiger and Rama (2006) model for detecting Type I error for 
observations with going concern audit report. Type I error when issuing a going concern 
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report occurs when the firm receiving a going concern report does not bankrupt in a 
reasonable period of time1. The model is: 
Bankrupt= ~O+ ~1Local + ~2Zscore + ~1Sales + ~~xch + ~5Bign + ~60fficenatexp 
+e 
If local auditors have information advantage that can increase the accuracy of going 
concern reports, B1 should have a positive sign, indicating that going concern reports 
issued by local auditors are more likely to follow by bankruptcies. However, a negative 
~1 can be interpreted as auditors having lower audit quality as evidenced by Type I error, 
or auditors are conservative. 
Control variables as modified and adopted from Geiger and Rama (2006) include 
financial stress score, natural log of sales, and stock exchange dummy variable. I measure 
financial stress score using Altman's Z-Score predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
The higher the Z-Score, the less likely that the firm will go bankrupt. As a result, 
predicted sign of the Z-Score is negative. The calculation of Z-score is indicated in the 
section of auditor-client distance prediction model. Sales is natural log of sales and exch 
is equal 1 if the firm is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Geiger and Rama (2006) 
use both variables as proxies for firm size and predict the sign of both variables as 
positive. They cited the work of Nogler (1995) that reports smaller firms are more likely 
to resolve the going concern uncertainties, while larger firms are more likely to file for 
bankruptcy. 
1 Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) suggests the reasonable period of time is 12 
months from the financial statement date. 
http://www.fasb.org(jsp/FASB/FASBContent C/ProjectUpdatePage&cid=l176160506645 
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As indicated in the model for likelihood of restatement, Big 4 auditors and industry 
expertise may mitigate the effect of auditor-client distance on audit quality. I include the 
variables to capture the mitigation effect. Kaplan and Williams (2012), using samples 
from the years 1989-2010, find that regional audit firms are more likely to issue going 
concern opinion to their distress clients, compared to Big 4 firms for the period after 
1995. However, going concern reports issued by regional auditors have higher type I 
enor than going concern reports issued by Big 4 auditors. The findings indicate that 
regional auditors increase their conservatism in issuing opinions. The authors also explain 
the reasons why Big 4 auditors are less likely to issue going concern opinion. First, Big 4 
auditors rely more on screening process in accepting new clients. The authors refer to A 
Statement of Position (1992) by Big 4 auditors about Big 4 auditors using formal firm-
wide screening process to avoid risky clients. Second, Big 4 auditors do not have clear 
structure in making going concern reporting decision leaving engagement partners with 
broad discretion in making the decision. Together with the mismatch between audit 
partners ' large compensation or profit from the engagements and small litigation costs in 
case of failing, Big 4 partners are less likely to issue going concern opinions and risk 
losing clients. Kaplan and Williams (2012) results support Geiger and Rama (2006) 
results, indicating that Big 4 auditors have a lower rate of Type I error. 
3.6 Likelihood of Type II error when firms went bankrupt without prior going 
concern report 
I modified the Geiger and Rama (2006) model for detecting Type II error when firms 
go bankrupt without prior going concern audit opinion. All variables are defined as in the 
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previous section. The model is: 
GoingConcern = Bo + B1Local + B2Zscore + B3Sales + B~xch + BsBign + 
B60fficenatexp + e 
If local auditors have information advantage that can increase the accuracy of going 
concern reports, P1 should have a positive sign, indicating that local auditors are more 
likely to issue going concern reports before the clients go bankrupt. All control variables 
are the same as in the model for detecting Type I error. 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Descriptive Statistic: 
[See Table 2] 
Descriptive statistics and univariate tests indicate that, as expected, firms located in 
the areas with a lower availability of local auditors are more likely to hire non-local 
auditors. Riskier firms are more likely to engage non-local auditors as evidenced by firms 
with non-local auditors having higher leverage, being more likely to report loss, having a 
higher chance of receiving a going concern report, having lower ROA, and having higher 
incidence of internal control weakness under SOX Section 302. 20 percent of firms with 
non-local auditors received a going concern report in the prior year, compared to 6 
percent of firms with local auditors. Half of non-local sample reported previous year loss, 
compared to 35 percent of local sample. 
Non-local firms pay a higher proportion of audit fees to total assets, indicating that 
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firms do not succeed in lowering audit fees by hiring non-local auditors. The result also 
supports the argument that hiring non-local auditors incur higher audit costs. There are 
several reasons driving the higher costs. First, audit fees include out of pocket travelling 
costs that firms have to pay to non-local auditors. Second, auditors have to use more 
effort and time, at least for the travelling, in auditing non-local clients; therefore, the 
auditors charge higher fees to non-local clients compared to local clients. Third, auditors 
may view non-local clients as risky clients when the auditors do not have the information 
advantage of being local auditors. Non-local firms have lower proportion of non-audit 
service fees to audit fees. Non-audit service may not be a significant factor to choose an 
auditor. 
Non-local firms are smaller, and less likely to engage Big 4 auditors or industry 
experts. 42 percent of non-local sample engage with Big 4 auditors, while 70 percent of 
local sample engage with Big 4 auditors. There are several implications from the results. 
First, firms hiring non-local auditors do not seek high quality auditors. Second, Big 4 
auditors and industry experts are not willing to accept non-local clients. Third, firms 
hiring non-local auditors cannot afford fee premium charged by Big 4 auditors and 
industry experts. 
The results support the argument that firms' headquarters are the center of financial 
information. Having many geography segments or foreign segments does not make firms 
and auditors less likely to have local auditor engagement. The results also support the 
argument that firms with better corporate governance, as measured by the percentages of 
institutional ownership and independent directors, are more likely to hire local auditors. 
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For audit quality variables, non-local firms are more likely to have misstatements. 
Non-local auditors have lower going concern report accuracy. Firms receiving a going 
concern report from local auditors are more likely to go bankrupt or are delisted within 
12 months and 24 months after the financial statement date, compared to firms receiving 
a going concern report from non-local auditors. 
4.2 Location model 
[See Table 3] 
Correlation matrix in Table 3 show some significant correlations (greater than 0:3) 
among variables in auditor location model. To further investigate the possibility of 
multicollinearity problem, I use variance inflation factors (VIF). The results do not show 
any VIF higher than 5, the conventional threshold to indicate multicollinearity problems. 
[See Table 4] 
The results in Table 4 show both numbers of Big 4 auditors and industry specialists 
in MSA have significant negative relationship with the likelihood of non-local auditor-
client engagement, indicating that the availability of local Big 4 auditors and other 
auditors lowers the likelihood of firms hiring non-local auditors. Loss firms, firms 
received going concern audit reports, firms with lower profitability (ROA), and firms 
with internal control weaknesses are more likely to engage non-local auditors. Highly 
levered firms are more likely to stay with local auditors. However, Leverage is only 
marginally significant (p < 0.10). The positive coefficient of audit fee to total assets ratio 
and the likelihood of distance relationship indicates that firms do not pay lower audit fees 
when hiring a non-local auditor. The negative coefficient of non-audit fee to audit fee 
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ratio indicates that firms hiring a non-local auditor do not pay significant amount of non-
audit fee. Big 4 auditors are less likely to be in non-local relationship, suggesting that 
firms engaging with non-local auditors do not seek high quality auditor; or Big 4 auditors 
are not willing to accept non-local clients. Smaller firms and firms with a lower 
percentage of institutional ownership are more likely to hire non-local auditors. If the 
percentage of institutional ownership is an indicator of corporate governance, good 
corporate governance firms are more likely to hire local auditors. The number of 
geographic segments does not affect the likelihood of hiring local or non-local auditors. 
However, firms with more foreign segments are more likely to hire local auditors. 
Overall, the results support the first and the second hypothesis but not the third 
hypothesis (as stated). Non-local auditor-client relationship is negatively associated with 
the availability of local auditors and positively associated with firm's financial risks and 
audit fees. 
4.3 Likelihood of restatement 
[See Table 5] 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics and univariate tests for variables in 
restatements model. The balance sample is based on propensity scores from the basic 
model predicting the chance of hiring local and non-local auditors with 0.01 caliper 
matching. The purpose of constructing the propensity score-matched sample is to 
control for the self-selection bias for firms in local and non-local groups. After the 
matching, all variables do not have significant difference in means. 
[See Table 6] 
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The first regression in Table 6 provides evidence on auditor-client distance and the 
likelihood of subsequent restatement, which indicates financial statements are misstated. 
The coefficient of local is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that financial 
statements audited by local auditors are less likely to be misstatement. The second 
regression provides evidence on auditor-client distance and the likelihood of restatement. 
Based on the information on restatement prompters by GAO in the Appendix B, most of 
restatement prompters are the company. Local is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that statements audited by local auditors are less likely to b subsequently 
restated. The results provide evidence that local auditors providing higher audit quality, 
and support Hypothesis 4a. 
4.4 Likelihood of going concern report 
[See Table 7 and Table 8] 
Table 7 reports no significant difference in variables predicting a going concern 
report between local and non-local auditors except for cash flows from operating activity. 
Non-local sample have lower cash flows from operating activity, compared to local 
sample. Table 8 provides evidence that local auditors are less likely to issue going 
concern reports. This result does not imply anything about audit quality. 
4.5 Likelihood of issuing going concern report with Type I error 
[See Table 10] 
Table 10 reports the results on Type I error model. In panel A, Bankrupt is identifies 
using bankruptcy information from SDC database and Bankruptcy Yearbook and 
Almanac. In Panel B, Bankrupt also includes delisted information from CRSP database 
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code 400-600 (liquidations, dropped, and expirations). The sample consists of firm-year 
observations with a going -concern audit opinion. The auditors have to issue a going 
concern opinion if there is evidence that the firms may not be able to continue their 
business within the next 12 month. The results provide limited support for the argument 
that local auditors provide high audit quality (Hypothesis 4b). Local is positive and 
significant in the sample that defined Bankrupt within two year period limited. Firms 
received going concern reports from local auditors are more likely to eventually go 
bankrupt or are delisted than firms received going concern report from non-local auditors. 
The result suggests that local auditors better predict the likelihood of firms going 
bankrupt or have lower Type I error on issuing going concern reports. However, when the 
bankruptcy time period is limited to one year after the fiscal year end, there is no 
significant evidence of a lower Type I error for local auditors. Overall, local auditors give 
more accurate warnings about firms continue as a going concern, but the warnings come 
long before 12 months of bankruptcy or delisted. 
4.6 Likelihood of issuing audit report with Type II error 
[See Table 11] 
Table 11 reports the results from the model for Type II error. The results do not show 
any significant difference in the going concern report Type II error between local and 
non-local auditors. There is no support for Hypothesis 4c. 
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5. ADDITIONAL TESTS 
5.1 Alternative reporting risk measurements 
[See Table 12] 
Table 12 provides results on the regression of non-local auditor-client relationship 
with two alternative financial reporting risks, Altman's Z score predicting the likelihood 
of bankruptcy and Benish's M Score predicting the likelihood of financial statements 
manipulation. Z Score, as introduced by Altman (1968) to predict the likelihood of 
bankruptcy, to capture bankruptcy risk. The Z-Score is calculated based on the model: 
Z Score= 1.2WC + 1.4RE + 3.3EBIT + 0.6Mkcap +Sales, where 
WC =(total current assets- total current liabilities)/total assets 
RE = retained earnings/ total assets 
EBIT = earnings before interests and taxes/ total assets 
Mkcap = market value of equity/total liabilities 
Sales =total revenues/total assets. 
I also use M Score from Beneish (1999) model predicting a chance of firm' s 
financial repmting manipulation to capture reporting risk. The M-Score is calculated 
based on the model: 
M-Score = -4.84 + 0.92DSRI + 0.528GMI + 0.404AQI + 0.892SGI + 0.115DEPI-
0.172SGAI + 4.679TAT A- 0.327L VGI, where 
DSRI = (accounts receivable/sales)/(lagged year accounts receivable/lagged year 
sales) 
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GMI = [(lagged year sales - lagged year cost of goods sold)/lagged year sales]/ 
[(sales-cost of goods sold)/sales] 
AQI = [ 1- (total current assets + PPE)/total assets]/[ lagged year 1- (total current 
assets + PPE)/total assets] 
SGI = sales/lagged year sales 
DEPI = [lagged year depreciation expense/( depreciation expense + 
PPE)]/[depreciation expense/( depreciation expense+ PPE)] 
SGAI = (selling, general, and administrative expenses/sales)/(lagged year selling, 
general, and administrative expenses/ lagged year sales) 
T ATA = ( change in current assets - change in cash - change in current liabilities -
change in the current portion of long term debt - change in tax payable - depreciation 
and amortization expense) I total assets 
LVGI = (total long term debt+ current liabilities)/total assets. 
PPE is property plants and equipment. 
The results in the M Score model suggest that firms with higher chance of financial 
manipulation are more likely to hire a non-local auditor, supporting Hypothesis 2. 
However, Z Score does not have a significant association with the likelihood of non-local 
auditor-client relationship. The likelihood to firms going bankrupt is not a factor 
determining the local and non-local audit-client relationship. 
5.2 Observations after the year 2003 and SOX 404 sample 
[See Table 13] 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is mandated in 2002. My sample period is 2000-2012. 
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To investigate the relationship between the predictors and the auditor-client distance after 
the SOX, I use subsample of firm-year observations with fiscal year in or after 2003. In 
addition to Section 302, Sarbanes-Oxley Act has Section 404 which requires auditors to 
have an opinion on the effectiveness of controls over financial reporting. Section 404 
with auditor attestation is required on only large public firms. I test the model with 
SOX404 as a proxy for firm's financial risk. Table 13 provides results on the regression 
of non-local auditor-client relationship for subsample of firm-year observations with 
fiscal year in or after 2003 and subsample for firms reporting the effectiveness of internal 
control under SOX Section 404. The results confirm Hypothesis 2 that risky firms, as 
proxied by the weakness in internal control, are more likely to engage non-local auditors. 
5.3 Types of restatement and restatement discovery time 
[See Table 14] 
Table 14 provides descriptive statistics and univariate tests for types of 
restatements and restatement discovery time. There are 4 types of restatements based on 
Audit Analytics classification, restatements due to accounting rule application failures, 
restatements due to financial fraud, irregularities and misrepresentations, restatements 
due to material accounting and clerical application errors, and restatements due to other 
significant issues. There is no significant difference in the types of restatement between 
local and non-local sample except that local restatements are more likely to be related to 
accounting rule application failures. For the restatement discovery time, the local sample 
identifies the misstatement within 192 days after the original financial statement date, 
while the non-local sample takes 204 days on average to find the mistake. 
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5.4 Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors 
[See Table 15] 
The factors determining the choice of local and non-local auditors may be different 
for firms hiring Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. Table 15 reports results for subsample of 
Big 4 auditors. The results show differences in factors determining auditor-client distance 
for Big 4 and non-Big 4 sample firms. The number of non-Big 4 firms available locally 
does not affect the decision of Big 4 clients to hire a local or non-local auditor. The only 
risk factor that affects the decision of Big 4 clients to hire a local or non-local auditor is 
Loss. Non-local Big 4 auditors charge a higher audit fee compared to local Big 4 auditors, 
but there is no significant difference in audit fee for non-Big 4 sample. 
[See Table 16-18] 
Table 16 provides the results on the logistic regression on the likelihood of 
restatement for Big 4 sample in Panel A and non-Big 4 sample in Panel B. Table 17 
provides the results on the logistic regression on the likelihood of issuing a going concern 
report. Table 18 reports the going concern report accuracy for Big 4 and non-Big 4 
sample clients. The results for non-Big 4 clients are similar to the main results, while the 
Big 4 sample shows no significant difference in audit quality in all measurements. The 
results from Table 15 and Table 16 suggest that Big 4 auditors are less likely to accept 
the clients where they cannot provide high audit quality. When Big 4 auditors accept non-
local auditors, the Big 4 auditors will ensure that client distance will not compromise 
their audit quality. Because of potential reputation costs from poor audit quality, Big 4 
auditors are willing to increase the costs relating to reduce the likelihood of bad audit. 
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The increased effort reflects in the higher audit fee for non-local Big 4 auditors. Overall, 
Big 4 auditors can control audit quality across all distances and they may not need to rely 
on local information advantage to provide high audit quality because good audit 
procedure can ensure accurate audit reports and detect material misstatements in financial 
statements. 
6. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
6.1 Unique firm sample 
[See Table 19] 
The full sample is comprised of 65,525 firm-year observations and 9,221 unique 
firms. Firms' business address from Audit Analytics and Compustat is the current 
headquarter address. Some firms may change the location of their headquarters during 
my sample period. Since I do not have such information, I do this robustness test using 
only the most recent year observation of each 9,221 firms. In the subsample of the most 
recent year observations, audit fee and previous year loss are not statistically significantly 
associated with the likelihood of local and non-local auditor-client relationship. Other 
risk factor results are robusted. 
6.2 The availability of local auditors 
[See Table 20] 
Table 20 provides the results of the likelihood of non-local auditor-client model 
using subsample of firm-year observation with the availability of local auditors. There are 
9,841 firm-year observations that are located in the MSA where there is no auditor. As a 
result, these firms must find an auditor from other MSAs. Although they may find an 
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auditor located within 100 miles driving distance, they may be more likely to engage a 
non-local auditor if there are few auditors nearby. The first column is the regression 
results for subsample of firm-year observations with at least one auditor in the MSA. The 
second column presents the results for non-Big 4 subsample with at least 12 (median of 
NumNonBigN_MSA in full sample) non-Big 4 auditors are available in the MSA. The last 
column presents the results for Big 4 subsample with at least 2 Big 4 auditors are 
available in the MSA. The results are similar as reported in the main test in Table 4, 
except that ROA and SOX302 are no longer significant predictors in the model for Big 4 
sample and SOX302 is not significant in non-Big 4 sample. 
6.3 Auditor change 
Factors determining the choice of local and non-local auditors may play an important 
role when firms decide to change their auditors rather than when they extend the contract 
with their current auditors. This additional test uses firm year observations with auditor 
changes. 
[See Table 21] 
In the subsample of auditor change, audit fee and loss are not statistically 
significantly associated with the likelihood of local and non-local auditor-client 
relationship. 
6.4 Distance as a continuous variable 
[See Table 22] 
The results in Table 22 are similar to the result in the main test in Table 4 and Big 4 
and non-Big 4 results in Table 15. The dependent variable in the model is the natural log 
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of the distance between the auditor and the client. The missing observations from the full 
sample are observations in Hawaii where there is no driving distance available. 
6.5 Alternative industry specialization proxies 
[See Table 23] 
The results in Table 23 do not show a significant association between the auditor 
industry specialization and the likelihood of non-local auditor-client relationship, which 
is similar to the result in the main test in Table 4. The proxies for industry specialization 
are rank variables instead of dummy variables. Office_nat_exp is the rank of industry 
specialization of a particular audit office at national level using total audit fees in each 
NAICS 2-digit industry code. Office_MSA_exp is the rank of a particular office at MSA 
level. 
6.6 Alternative audit fees proxies 
[See Table 24] 
Abnormal audit fee as identified as a residual from audit fee models, and total audit 
fee are positively associated with the likelihood of non-local auditor-client relationship, 
which is similar to the result in the main test in Table 4. Hiring a non-local auditor does 
not lower audit fees. I use the Fields et al. (2004) model to estimate audit fees for banks. I 
do not include standard deviation of daily return due to its insignificant in Fields et al. 
(2004) results. The model is: 
LOGFEE=,Bo + ,81LOGASS + ,82BIGS + ,83LOSS + ,84TRANSACCT + ,85SECURITIES + 
f36EFFICIENCY + ,87COMMLOAN + ,88NONPERFORM + ,89CHGOFF + f310MTGLOAN + fJ 
11CAPRATIO + /ft 2INTANG + ,813SENSITIVE + Pt4SAVINGS + t: , where 
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LOGFEE=logarithm of audit fee. 
LOGASS=logarithm of total assets. 
BIG5=1 if auditor is a Big 4 accounting firm, =0 otherwise. 
LOSS= I if bank had a net loss for the year, =0 otherwise. 
TRANSACCT=total transaction accounts/total deposits. 
SECURITIES=[ I -(total securities/total assets)]. 
EFFICIENCY=efficiency ratio (total operating expenses/total revenue). 
COMMLOAN=total commercial and agricultural loans/gross loans. 
NONPERFORM=nonperforming loans/gross loans. 
CHGOFF=net charge-offs/loan loss reserve. 
MTGLOAN=total domestic real estate and home equity loans/gross loans. 
CAPRATIO=total risk-adjusted capital ratio. 
INT ANG=intangible assets/total assets. 
SENSITIVE=rate-sensitive assets minus rate-sensitive liabilities. 
SA VINGS=l if organization is a savings institution, =0 otherwise. 
6. 7 Small and large firms 
[See Table 25] 
Table 25 presents the results for small and large firm samples. I partition small and 
large firm sample as the lower and upper quartile using Size variable. Financial reporting 
risks are significant associated with the likelihood of non-local auditor-client relationship 
for firms in the lower quartile, while some factors are not significant for large firms. The 
availability of local auditors is a significant predictor for both small and large firms. 
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6.8 Sample outside MSAs. 
[See Table 26] 
In Table 26, I include observations with business address outside MSA but have 
other variables in the predicting model. The results are similar to the main model in Table 
4. 
6.9 Full sample 
[See Table 27 -30] 
These tables present results for audit quality models for full sample of 65,525 firm-
year observations without propensity score matched. Propensity score matching results in 
losing a majority of observations in audit quality models. In addition, since there is no 
well-established model predicting the local and non-local auditor-client relationship and 
there can be unobservable factors that cannot be capture in the model, I cannot be certain 
that the propensity score matching process will eliminate selection bias, and does not 
increase the bias. I provide the results for full sample without the propensity score 
matching process. The results are the same as the results with propensity score- matched 
sample. 
6.10 Non-local non-Big 4 sample 
[See Table 31] 
The variable of interest in this model is Localavail that takes the value one if the 
number of non-Big 4 auditors in the MSA is greater than 8 (median of 
NumnonBigN_MSA for non-local sample). Some firms have no other options but the hire 
a non-local auditor because there is no local auditor available. However, some firms still 
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hire a non-local non-Big 4 auditor while there are local auditors available. These firms 
may have some different characteristics compared to the firms with no other options, and 
these factors may affect audit quality. The results suggest that firms that hire a non-local 
non-Big 4 auditor while there are local auditors available are more likely to have 
misstatement compared to firms that hire a non-local auditor because of lacking local 
choices. A possible explanation is that these firms have some risks that local auditors are 
not willing to accept and such risks cannot be detected or reduced by non-local auditors. 
The results may confirm the story of adverse selection when risky firms are rejected by 
well-informed local auditors and are forced to hire less-informed non-local auditors. 
6.11 Very far distance 
[See Table 32] 
I use a threshold of 100 miles driving distance to separate local and non-local 
auditor-client relationship where the auditor and the client are not in the same city or the 
same MSA. However, within the non-local sample, there may be some differences 
between an auditor and a client that are located within couple hours drive and an auditor 
and a client that are located very far away from each other. The variable of interest in this 
test is Far which takes the value of one if the auditor and the client are more than 944 
miles apart (median distance for non-local firms). When the auditor and the client are 
very far away, the auditor must increase a significant amount of effort to travel to the 
client. As a result, the auditor may reduce the frequency and the duration of client visits. 
In addition, information asymmetry between the auditor and the client may be higher for 
this very far relationship compared to a not-so-far relationship. News and information 
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may be available for non-local auditors who live within couple hundreds mile radius from 
clients. Auditors and clients may still share the same social circles. The result suggests 
that firms that hire an auditor from very far away are more likely to have misstatement 
compared to firms that hire a non-local auditor but the distance between the auditor and 
the client is not very far away. In addition, non-local auditors who are very far away from 
their clients are more likely to issue a going concern opinion. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The overall results suggest that the availability of local Big 4 auditors and other 
auditors lowers the likelihood of firms hiring non-local auditors. Also, the evidence 
suggests that firms with high audit risk are more likely to seek non-local auditors. Higher 
non-local audit fee levels imply that firms fail to lower audit fees by hiring non-local 
auditors. 
The results on the impact of auditor-client distance on audit quality provide limited 
support on the local auditors having higher audit quality compared to non-local auditors. 
Financial statements audited by local auditors are less likely to be restated. There is 
limited evidence supporting local auditors having lower Type I error in issuing going 
concern report. The results are pronounced for non-Big 4 clients while there is no 
significant difference for local and non-local Big 4 sample. Big 4 auditors can control 
audit quality across all distances and the local information advantage is not important for 
them to maintain audit quality 
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This study has some limitations. First, I do not take into account business locations 
other than headquarters of firms. Some firms have major business locations far from their 
headquarters. These locations may be the center of accounting information in which 
auditors should spend more time. Second, the address on the audit report shows the city 
of the audit partner. In some cases, the audit firm has a local office in the same city as the 
client's headquarters, however, the audit rep01t specifies another city. In this case, it's 
more likely that the audit partner, who is a non-local auditor, may work with the local 
audit team. The auditor-client distance will indicate the distance between the audit 
partner and his/her client rather than the distance between the audit team and the client. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Defmition 
Defmition 
The Main Distance Model 
Nonlocal 
= 1 if the firm and the auditor are not in the same city or the same Metropolitan or 
Micropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and the driving distance between the firm 
and the auditor is farther than 100 miles; and 0 otherwise. 
Availability of Local Auditors Variables 
NumBigN_MSA 
NumnonBigN _MSA 
Risk Variables 
Lave rage 
Loss 
GoingConcern 
ROA 
SOX302 
= number of Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Area 
where the firm is located 
= number of rion-Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical 
Area where the firm is located 
= total liabilities/total assets 
= 1 if the firm reported net loss in the previous year, and 0 otherwise 
= 1 if the firm received a going concern audit opinion in the previous year, and 0 
otherwise 
= net income/total assets 
= 1 if the firm reported internal control weaknesses under Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 Section 302, and 0 otherwise 
0\ 
N 
Variable 
Fee Variables 
Nafeeratio 
Auditfee 
Control Variables 
BigN 
Officenatexp 
InstOwner 
lndepentDT 
Size 
BookMK 
Numsegment 
Numfrgnseg 
Frgnsegrev 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Appendix A (continued) 
Variable Definition 
Definition 
natural log of total non audit fees/total audit fees 
natural log of total audit fees/total assets 
1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise 
1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise 
total number of common shares owned by institutional investors/total number of 
common shares outstanding 
total number of independent directors /total number of directors 
natural log of total assets 
book value of owners' equity/ market value of the firm 
number of geographic segments 
number of foreign segments 
natural log of total revenues from foreign segments 
0\ 
w 
Variable 
Appendix A (continued) 
Variable Definition 
Definition 
Audit Quality and Other Variables 
Bankrupt 
Bnkdl 
Going_concern 
Subsqrest 
CurrentRestate 
TypeOnelyr 
Type0ne2yr 
TypeOnedllyr 
Type0nedl2yr 
TypeTwobnk 
TypeTwobnkdl 
= 1 if the firm-year observation is the most recent year before bankruptcy, and 0 otherwise 
= 1 if the firm-year observation is the most recent year before bankruptcy or delisting, and 
0 otherwise 
= 1 if the firm received a going concern audit opinion in the current year, and 0 otherwise 
1 if the financial statements were misstated and later restated, and 0 otherwise 
1 if there is a restatement disclosure during the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
= 1 if the auditor issued a go!ng concern report but the firm did not bankrupt within 12 
months, and 0 otherwise 
1 if the auditor issued a going concern report but the firm did not bankrupt within 24 
months, and 0 otherwise 
= 1 if the auditor issued a going concern repmt but the firm did not bankrupt or was 
delisted within 12 months, and 0 otherwise 
= 1 if the auditor issued a going concern report but the firm did not bankrupt or was 
delisted within 24 months, and 0 otherwise 
- · 1 if the firm went bankrupt but the most recent audit opinion before the bankruptcy was 
not a going concern opinion, and 0 otherwise 
= 1 if the firm went bankrupt or was delisted but the most recent audit opinion before the 
bankruptcy was not a going concern opinion, and 0 otherwise 
0\ 
~ 
Variable 
Appendix A (continued) 
Variable Definition 
Definition 
Additional Tests and Robustness Tests 
Distance 
Zscore 
we 
RE 
EBIT 
Mkcap 
Sales 
Mscore 
DSRI 
GMI 
AQI 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
natural log of the distance between the firm and the auditor in miles. If the firm and 
the auditor are in the same city or the same MSA, Distance equals 0. 
Altman's Z score predicting the likelihood of restatement. The calculation is: 
1.2WC + 1.4RE + 3.3EBIT + 0.6Mkcap +Sales, where 
(total current assets- total current liabilities)/total assets 
retained earnings/ total assets 
earnings before interests and taxes/ total assets 
market value of equity/total liabilities 
total revenues/total assets 
Benish's M score predicting the chance of financial statement manipulation. The 
calculation is: 
-4.84 + 0.92DSRI + 0.528GMI + 0.404AQI + 0.892SGI + 0.115DEPI- 0.172SGAI + 
4.679TATA- 0.327LVGI, where 
(accounts receivable/sales)/lagged year (accounts receivable/sales) 
[(lagged year sales -lagged year cost of goods sold)/lagged year sales]/ [(sales-cost 
of goods sold)/sales] 
[ 1- (total current assets + PPE)/total assets]/[ lagged year 1- (total current assets + 
PPE)/total assets] 
0\ 
Vl 
Variable 
SGI 
DEPI 
SGAI 
TATA 
LVGI 
Totalfee 
Nonauditfee 
Abnlfee 
Appendix A (continued) 
Variable Definition 
Definition 
= sales/lagged year sales 
= [lagged year depreciation expense/( depreciation expense+ PPE)]/[depreciation 
expense/( depreciation expense+ PPE)] 
= (selling, general, and administrative expenses/sales)/(lagged year selling, general, and 
administrative expenses/ lagged year sales) 
= (change in current assets - change in cash - change in current liabilities - change in 
the current portion of long term debt - change in tax payable - depreciation and 
ammtization expense) I total assets 
= (total long term debt+ current liabilities)/total assets. 
= 
= 
= 
natural log of total non-audit fees and audit fees/total assets 
natural log of total non-audit fees/total assets 
residual from audit fee model. Audit fee model for bank is: 
LOGFEE= {3 0 + {3 lLOGASS + {3 2BIG5 + {3 3LOSS + {3 4TRANSACCT + {3 
5SECURITIES + {3 6EFFICIENCY + {3 7COMMLOAN + {3 8NONPERFORM + 
{3 9CHGOFF + {3 lOMTGLOAN + {3 llCAPRATIO + {3 12INTANG + {3 
13SENSITIVE + {3 14SA VINGS + E , where 
Appendix A (continued) 
Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
LOG FEE 
= logarithm of audit fee. 
LOG ASS 
= logarithm of total assets. 
BIGS 
= 1 if auditor is a Big 4 accounting firm, 0 otherwise 
LOSS 
= 1 if bank had a net loss for the year, 0 otherwise 
TRANSACCT 
= total transaction accounts/total deposits. 
SECURITIES 
= [1- (total securities/total assets)]. 
0\ EFFICIENCY 
0\ 
= efficiency ratio (total operating expenses/total revenue). 
COMMLOAN 
= total commercial and agricultural loans/gross loans. 
NONPERFORM 
= nonperforming loans/gross loans. 
CHGOFF 
= net charge-offs/loan loss reserve. 
MTGLOAN 
= total domestic real estate and home equity loans/gross loans. 
CAP RATIO 
= total risk-adjusted capital ratio. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. 
AppendixB 
Restatement prompters distributions 
Frequency 
Restatement prompter misstatement restatement 
Auditor 120 69 
Company 1,819 1,024 
Company/ Auditor 252 124 
Company/FASB 4 2 
Company/SEC 7 3 
External 4 2 
FASB 
Other 9 7 
SEC 209 137 
Unknown · 476 286 
no information 6,485 4,243 
Total 9,385 5,897 
This Appendix provides the distributions of restatement prompters 
from the U.S. Government Accountability Office. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection, Sample Distribution, and Number of Auditor Offices 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
All audit opinions for fiscal year end 2000-2012 
Delete: observations without auditor's location 
Delete: observations that are not on Compustat 
Delete: observations with foreign auditor location or foreign firm 
location 
Delete: observations without audit fee information 
Delete: observations with missing data for basic location model 
Delete: observations with business address outside MSA 
Final Sample 
68 
217,974 
(1,067) 
(120,145) 
(14,304) 
(9,081) 
(6,659) 
(1,193) 
65,525 
TABLE 1 (continued) 
Panel B: Local and Non-local Sam~le Distribution b~ Year 
Observations Percentages 
Fiscal 
non-local local Total non-local local 
ear 
2000 598 3,335 3,933 15.20% 84.80% 
2001 800 4,532 5,332 15.00% 85.00% 
2002 926 4,704 5,630 16.45% 83.55% 
2003 948 4,752 5,700 16.63% 83.37% 
2004 980 4,727 5,707 17.17% 82.83% 
2005 972 4,600 5,572 17.44% 82.56% 
2006 935 4,488 5,423 17.24% 82.76% 
2007 898 4,317 5,215 17.22% 82.78% 
2008 846 4,064 4,910 17.23% 82.77% 
2009 795 3,918 4,713 16.87% 83.13% 
2010 755 3,813 4,568 16.53% 83.47% 
2011 736 3,747 4,483 16.42% 83.58% 
2012 827 3,512 4,339 19.06% 80.94% 
Total 11,016 54,509 65,525 16.81 % 83.19% 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Panel C: Local and Non-local Distribution b~ Year for Big 4 and Non-Big 4 Sam~le 
Big 4 Sam~le Non-Big 4 Sam~le 
Observations Percentages Observations Percentages 
non- non- non- non-
Fiscal ~ear local local Total local local local local Total local local 
2000 448 2,871 3,319 13.50% 86.50% 150 464 614 24.43% 75.57% 
2001 561 3,794 4,355 12.88% 87.12% 239 738 977 24.46% 75.54% 
2002 529 3,690 4,219 12.54% 87.46% 397 1,014 1,411 28.14% 71.86% 
2003 480 3,544 4,024 11.93% 88.07% 468 1,208 1,676 27.92% 72.08% 
2004 414 3,361 3,775 10.97% 89.03% 566 1,366 1,932 29.30% 70.70% 
2005 374 3,065 3,439 10.88% 89.12% 598 1,535 2,133 28.04% 71.96% 
2006 334 2,895 3,229 10.34% 89.66% 601 1,593 2,194 27.39% 72.61 % 
2007 297 2,733 3,030 9.80% 90.20% 601 1,584 2,185 27.51 % 72.49% 
-...) 2008 273 2,597 2,870 9.51% 90.49% 573 1,467 2,040 28.09% 71.91 % 0 
2009 263 2,517 2,780 9.46% 90.54% 532 1,401 1,933 27.52% 72.48% 
2010 249 2,494 2,743 9.08% 90.92% 506 1,319 1,825 27.73% 72.27% 
2011 232 2,457 2,689 8.63% 91.37% 504 1,290 1,794 28.09% 71.91 % 
2012 282 2,359 2,641 10.68% 89.32% 545 1,153 1,698 32.10% 67.90% 
Total 4,736 38,377 43,113 10.99% 89.01 % 6,280 16,132 22,412 28.02% 71.98% 
TABLE 1 (continued) 
Panel D: Sample Distribution by NAICS 2-digit Code 
Observations Percentages 
NAICS Non- Non-
2-digit Industry Description local Local local Local 
11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 62 96 39.24% 60.76% 
21 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 789 2,068 27.62% 72.38% 
22 Utilities 317 1,121 22.04% 77.96% 
23 Construction 120 647 15.65% 84.35% 
31 Manufacturing - Food, beverage, tobacco, textile, apparel, and leather 303 1,653 15.49% 84.51% 
32 Manufacturing- Wood, paper, printing, Petroleum and Coal, Chemical, 1,181 6,185 16.03% 83.97% 
Plastics and Rubber Products, Nonmetallic Mineral Products 
-...} 33 Manufacturing- Primary Metal, Fabricated Metal, Machinery, 1,972 12,697 13.44% 86.56% 
....... Computer and Electronic, Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and 
Component, Transportation Equipment, and Furniture and Related 
Product 
42 Wholesale Trade 334 1,576 17.49% 82.51% 
44 Retail Trade - Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers, Furniture and Home 169 1,312 11.41% 88.59% 
Furnishings Stores, Electronics and Appliance Stores, Building 
Material and Garden Equipment and Supplies Dealers, Food and 
Beverage Stores, Health and Personal Care Stores, Gasoline Stations, 
and Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores · 
45 Retail Trade- Sporting Goods, Hobby, Musical Instrument, and Book 98 85310.30% 89.70% 
Stores, General Merchandise Stores, Miscellaneous Store Retailers, and 
Non-store Retailers 
TABLE 1 (continued) 
Panel D (continued): Sam~le Distribution b~ NAICS 2-digit Code 
Observations Percentages 
NAICS Non- Non-
2-digit Industr~ Descri~tion local Local local Local 
48 Transportation and Warehousing- Air, Rail, Water, Truck, Pipeline, 267 1,047 20.32% 79.68% 
Scenic and Sightseeing, and Support Activities 
49 Transportation and Warehousing - Postal Service, Couriers and 4 99 3.88% 96.12% 
Messengers, and Warehousing and Storage 
51 Information 1,057 4,605 18.67% 81.33% 
52 Finance and Insurance 2,489 11,585 17.69% 82.31% 
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 135 806 14.35% 85.65% 
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 786 3,828 17.04% 82.96% 
-..l 55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 119 348 25.48% 74.52% 
N 56 Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation 328 1,042 23.94% 76.06% 
Services 
61 Educational Services 39 207 15.85% 84.15% 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 168 940 15.16% 84.84% 
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 96 337 22.17% 77.83% 
72 Accommodation and Food Services 159 1,133 12.31% 87.69% 
81 Other Services (except Public Administration) 15 274 5.19% 94.81% 
92 Public Administration 9 50 15.25% 84.75% 
Total 11,016 54,509 
TABLE 1 (continued) 
Panel E: Numbers of Auditor Offices 
Year PWC EY Deloitte KPMG AA Total Non- Total 
BigS Big 5 
2000 85 83 79 84 72 403 1,292 1,695 
2001 78 78 75 84 71 386 1,192 1,578 
2002 73 79 74 86 33 345 1,096 1,441 
2003 73 79 76 84 0 312 975 1,287 
2004 72 77 74 83 0 306 883 1,189 
2005 71 75 74 79 0 299 884 1,183 
2006 67 73 74 80 0 294 894 1,188 
2007 63 72 69 74 0 278 873 1,151 
2008 60 72 67 73 0 272 856 1,128 
2009 62 72 67 75 0 276 823 1,099 
2010 63 71 63 75 0 272 818 1,090 
2011 61 70 61 76 0 268 785 1,053 
2012 65 70 61 75 0 271 746 1,017 
Panel A presents sample selection for the location model. Panel B provides the 
distribution of local and non-local observations. Local observations are the 
observations that the auditor and the client are in the same city or the same 
Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Area, or the auditor and the client are 
located within 100 miles driving distance by Google Map. Panel C provides the 
distributions of local and non-local observations for Big 5 and non-Big 5 sample. 
Big 5 are large international accounting firms, which include: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Ernst & Young (EY), Deloitte, KPMG, and 
Arthur Andersen (AA). After 2002, Big 5 became Big 4 when Arthur Andersen 
surrendered its CPA licenses and its right to practice before the SEC on August 
31, 2002. Big 4 and Big N are used interchangeably in this paper to refer to these 
large public accounting firms. Panel D provides the distribution of local and non-
local observations by 2-digit North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) code. According to the Census Bureau, NAICS was developed under 
the auspices of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and adopted in 
1997 to replace the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. Panel E 
presents numbers of auditor offices. 
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TABLE2 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test 
Panel A: Full Sam~le 
Variable Non-Local (N = 11,016) Local (N = 54,509) Diff. in t-value 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
A vailabilitx of Local Auditors Variables 
NumBigN_MSA 2.867 4.000 1.859 3.551 4.000 1.478 -0.684 -36.370 *** 
NumnonBigN _MSA 18.694 8.000 28.204 24.836 12.000 32.868 -6.142 -20.250 
NumExp_MSA 0.440 0.000 1.009 0.741 0.000 1.197 -0.301 -27.630 *** 
Risk Variables 
Leverage 1.341 0.624 2.797 0.716 0.554 1.295 0.625 22.960 *** 
Loss 0.506 1.000 0.500 0.357 0.000 0.479 0.150 28.840 *** 
GoingConcern 0.208 0.000 0.406 0.060 0.000 0.238 0.148 36.950 *** 
-.J ROA -0.810 -0.004 2.353 -0.183 0.013 1.034 -0.627 -27.440 *** 
+>- SOX302 0.078 0.000 0.268 0.041 0.000 0.199 0.037 13.710 *** 
Fee Variables 
Nafeeratio 0.571 0.785 0.392 0.691 0.831 0.330 -0.120 -30.160 *** 
Auditfee 0.685 0.679 0.074 0.668 0.670 0.057 0.017 22.570 *** 
TABLE 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test 
Panel A: Full Sam~le 
Variable Non-Local (N = 11,016) Local (N = 54,509) Diff. in t-value 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
Control Variables 
BigN 0.430 0.000 0.495 0.704 1.000 0.456 -0.274 -53.690 *** 
Officenatexp 0.013 0.000 0.112 0.032 0.000 0.176 -0.020 -14.970 *** 
InstOwner 0.006 0.002 0.012 0.007 0.005 0.012 -0.002 -11.820 *** 
IndepentDT 0.093 0.000 0.247 0.181 0.000 0.322 -0.088 -32.290 *** 
Size 4.553 4.616 2.666 5.823 5.927 2.347 -1 .270 -46.480 *** 
BookMK 0.440 0.466 1.632 0.602 0.525 1.227 -0.163 -9.920 *** 
Numsegment 1.323 1.000 2.021 1.933 1.000 2.437 -0.610 -27.850 *** 
-...l Numfrgnseg 0.099 0.000 0.298 0.141 0.000 0.348 -0.043 -13.320 *** 
VI 
1.863 Frgnsegrev 1.014 0.000 2.103 0.000 2.727 -0.849 -36.610 *** 
TABLE 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test 
Panel A: Full Sam~le 
Variable Non-Local (N = 11,016) Local (N = 54,509) Diff. in t-value 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
Audit Quality Variables 
Bankrupt 0.014 0.000 0.117 0.011 0.000 0.102 0.003 2.870 *** 
Bnkdl 0.020 0.000 0.140 0.017 0.000 0.129 0.003 2.170 ** 
Going_concern 0.224 0.000 0.417 0.071 0.000 0.256 0.154 37.260 *** 
Subsqrest 0.154 0.000 0.361 0.139 0.000 0.346 0.015 3.930 *** 
Currentrestate 0.103 0.000 0.304 0.086 0.000 0.280 0.017 5.480 *** 
TypeOnelyr 0.977 1.000 0.150 0.949 LOOO 0.220 0.028 5.870 *** 
Type0ne2yr 0.962 1.000 0.190 0.913 1.000 0.281 0.049 8.140 *** 
-.) TypeOnedll yr 0.966 1.000 0.181 0.921 1.000 0.270 0.045 7.840 *** 
0\ 
Type0nedl2yr 0.223 0.948 1.000 0.878 1.000 0.328 0.070 9.930 *** 
TypeTwobnk 0.461 0.000 0.500 0.493 0.000 0.500 -0.032 -0.700 
TypeTwobnkdl 0.514 1.000 0.501 0.572 1.000 0.495 -0.058 -1.560 
TABLE 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test 
Panel B: Big N Sam~le 
Variable Non-Local (N = 4,736) Local (N = 38,377) Diff. in t-value 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
Availability of Local Auditors Variables 
NumBigN_MSA 2.871 4.000 1.969 3.686 4.000 1.382 -0.815 -27.650 *** 
NumnonBigN _MSA 18.673 7.000 30.014 23.156 12.000 31.681 -4.484 -9.640 *** 
NumExp_MSA 0.545 0.000 1.107 0.747 0.000 1.177 -0.202 -11.780 *** 
Risk Variables 
Leverage 0.606 0.577 0.559 0.561 0.540 0.401 0.045 5.360 *** 
Loss 0.358 0.000 0.480 0.310 0.000 0.463 0.048 6.530 *** 
GoingConcern 0.036 0.000 0.186 0.020 0.000 0.140 0.016 5.710 *** -..l 
-..l 
ROA -0.109 0.015 0.622 -0.052 0.023 0.414 -0.057 -6.100 *** 
SOX302 0.024 0.000 0.155 0.026 0.000 0.160 -0.002 -0.730 
Fee Variables 
Nafeeratio 0.712 0.843 0.320 0.737 0.846 0.295 -0.025 -5.060 *** 
Auditfee 0.665 0.664 0.051 0.665 0.667 0.048 0.000 -0.240 
TABLE 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test 
Panel B: Big N Sam~le 
Variable Non-Local (N = 4,736) Local (N = 38,377) Diff. in t-value 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
Control Variables 
Officenatexp 0.029 0.000 0.169 0.045 0.000 0.208 -0.016 -6.010 *** 
Ins tOwner 0.006 0.004 0.011 0.007 0.005 0.010 -0.001 -4.960 *** 
IndepentDT 0.203 0.000 0.334 0.246 0.000 0.354 -0.043 -8.360 *** 
Size 6.337 6.561 2.054 6.563 6.528 2.036 -0.227 -7.230 *** 
BookMK 0.629 0.545 1.279 0.615 0.511 1.044 0.014 0.720 
Numsegment 2.000 1.000 2.407 2.230 1.000 2.536 -0.230 -6.160 *** 
-.l Numfrgnseg 0.139 0.000 0.346 0.160 0.000 0.366 -0.021 -3.880 *** 00 
Frgnsegrev 1.901 0.000 2.729 2.371 0.000 2.970 -0.470 -11.060 *** 
TABLE 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test 
Panel B: Big N Sam~le 
Variable Non-Local (N = 4,736) Local (N = 38,377) Diff. in t-value 
Mean Median Std Dev Median Std Dev Means 
Audit Quality Variables 
Bankrupt 0.013 0.000 0.113 0.009 0.000 0.097 0.003 1.980 ** 
Bnkdl 0.019 0.000 0.135 0.014 0.000 0.118 0.004 2.170 ** 
Going_concern 0.055 0.000 0.229 0.030 0.000 0.170 0.025 7.410 *** 
Subsqrest 0.159 0.000 0.365 0.151 0.000 0.358 0.008 1.340 
Currentrestate 0.093 0.000 0.290 0.088 0.000 0.283 0.005 1.210 
TypeOnelyr 0.916 1.000 0.277 0.892 1.000 0.311 0.025 1.210 
Type0ne2yr 0.874 1.000 0.332 0.839 1.000 0.367 0.035 1.360 
-...l 
\0 TypeOnedllyr 0.874 1.000 0.332 0.838 1.000 0.368 0.036 1.490 
Type0nedl2yr 0.808 1.000 0.395 0.774 1.000 0.418 0.033 1.130 
TypeTwobnk 0.541 1.000 0.502 0.558 1.000 0.497 -0.017 -0.240 
TypeTwobnkdl 0.580 1.000 0.496 0.601 1.000 . 0.490 -0.022 -0.390 
TABLE 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test 
Panel C: Non-Big N SamJ!le 
Variable Non-Local (N = 6,280) Local (N = 16,132) Diff. in t-value 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
Availability of Local Auditors Variables 
NumBigN_MSA 2.864 4.000 1.771 3.231 4.000 1.641 -0.367 -14.210 *** 
NumnonBigN _MSA 18.711 9.000 26.759 28.831 14.000 35.214 -10.121 -23.160 *** 
NumExp_MSA 0.361 0.000 0.920 0.726 0.000 1.245 -0.365 -24.040 *** 
Risk Variables 
Leverage 1.895 0.724 3.574 1.085 0.619 2.257 0.810 . 16.710 *** 
Loss 0.618- 1.000 0.486 0.467 0.000 0.499 0.151 20.710 *** 
00 
GoingConcern 0.337 0.000 0.473 0.156 0.000 0.362 0.182 27.500 *** 
0 ROA -1.338 -0.086 2.962 -0.492 0.003 1.753 -0.846 -21.230 *** 
SOX302 0.119 0.000 0.323 0.077 0.000 0.266 0.042 9.120 *** 
Fee Variables 
Nafeeratio 0.464 0.723 0.407 0.583 0.795 0.381 -0.118 -19.890 *** 
Auditfee 0.700 0.694 0.084 0.675 0.680 0.073 0.025 20.430 *** 
TABLE 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test 
Panel C: Non-Big N Sample 
Non-Local (N = 6,280) Local (N = 16,132) Diff. in t-value 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
Control Variables 
OfficeMSAexp 0.157 0.000 0.364 0.146 0.000 0.353 0.011 2.080 ** 
InstOwner 0.005 0.000 0.013 0.008 0.004 0.016 -0.003 -13.010 *** 
IndepentDT 0.009 0.000 0.081 0.024 0.000 0.128 -0.015 -10.290 *** 
Size 3.208 2.985 2.253 4.060 3.906 2.082 -0.852 -25.960 *** 
BookMK 0.297 0.347 1.842 0.573 0.568 1.579 -0.276 -10.480 *** 
Numsegment 0.813 0.000 1.480 1.228 1.000 2.014 -0.415 -16.930 *** 
00 
Numfrgnseg 0.068 0.000 0.252 0.098 0.000 0.297 -0.029 -7.440 *** ...... 
Frgnsegrev 0.346 0.000 1.049 0.657 0.000 1.438 -0.311 -17.850 *** 
TABLE 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test 
Panel C: Non-Big N Sam~le 
Variable Non-Local (N = 6,280) Local (N = 16,132) Diff. in t-value 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
Audit Quality Variables 
Bankrupt 0.015 0.000 0.121 0.013 0.000 0.113 0.002 1.010 
Bnkdl 0.021 0.000 0.143 0.023 0.000 0.151 -0.002 -1.060 
Going_concern 0.352 0.000 0.478 0.168 0.000 0.374 0.184 27.430 *** 
Subsqrest 0.150 0.000 0.357 0.111 0.000 0.314 0.040 7.700 *** 
Currentrestate 0.111 0.000 0.314 0.082 0.000 0.275 0.029 6.360 *** 
TypeOnelyr 0.984 1.000 0.127 0.973 1.000 0.164 0.011 2.610 *** 
Type0ne2yr 0.972 1.000 0.165 0.944 1.000 0.231 0.029 4.980 *** 00 
N TypeOnedll yr 0.976 1.000 0.153 0.955 1.000 0.208 0.022 4.140 *** 
Type0nedl2yr 0.963 1.000 0.189 0.920 1.000 0.272 0.043 6.450 *** 
TypeTwobnk 0.409 0.000 0.494 0.381 0.000 0.487 0.028 0.450 
TypeTwobnkdl 0.470 0.000 0.501 0.529 1.000 0.500 -0.060 -1.180 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the logistic regression predicting the likelihood of non-
local auditor-client relationship and audit quality related variables. Panel A presents the results for full sample. Panel B 
presents the results from Big N sample. Panel C presents the results from non-Big N sample. All variables are defined as 
in Appendix A.***,** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). Chi-square tests 
for categorical variables provide the same significance levels as t-tests do. 
TABLE3 
Correlation Matrix: Spearman Correlations above Diagonal, Pearson Correlations below Diagonal 
Local Num Numnon NumExp Lever Loss Going Roa Sox302 Nafee Fee ratio 
Variables BigN_ BigN_ _MSA age Concern ratio 
Msa Msa 
Local 0.144 0.111 0.118 -0.072 -0.115 -0.198 0.134 -0.065 0.116 -0.070 
NumBigN_MSA 0.163 0.607 0.301 -0.118 0.073 -0.038 -0.035 -0.052 0.202 0.006 
NumnonBigN _MSA 0.071 0.374 0.475 -0.068 0.092 0.057 -0.039 0.021 -0.006 0.158 
NumExp_MSA 0.096 0.282 0.599 0.015 -0.031 0.023 0.004 0.021 0.089 
Leverage -0.141 -0.028 0.032 0.027 0.247 -0.230 0.064 -0.039 -0.149 
Loss -0.115 0.080 0.049 0.007 0.175 0.337 -0.572 0.119 -0.138 0.372 
Goingconcem -0.198 -0.007 0.042 -0.022 0.477 0.337 -0.334 0.171 -0.191 0.318 
ROA 0.171 -0.012 -0.043 0.016 -0.753 -0.288 -0.498 -0.107 0.137 -0.231 
00 SOX302 -0.065 w -0.017 0.004 0.007 0.137 0.119 0.171 -0.139 -0.123 0.186 
Nafeeratio 0.131 0.032 -0.005 0.007 -0.152 -0.142 -0.203 0.181 -0.116 -0.279 
Auditfee -0.104 0.113 0.087 0.047 0.381 0.386 0.405 -0.479 0.202 -0~235 
BigN 0.216 0.141 -0.049 0.041 -0.213 -0.189 -0.315 0.232 -0.139 0.254 -0.135 
Officenatexp 0.044 0.057 0.097 0.232 -0.028 -0.025 -0.042 0.034 -0.004 0.047 0.015 
Ins towner 0.048 -0.019 -0.022 -0.035 -0.068 -0.007 -0.077 0.075 -0.011 0.003 -0.029 
Indepentdt 0.106 0.042 -0.040 0.015 -0.085 -0.259 -0.159 0.124 -0.072 0.141 -0.123 
Size 0.194 -0.029 -0.075 0.074 -0.279 -0.452 -0.446 0.406 -0.125 0.252 -0.558 
Bookmk 0.047 -0.027 -0.025 -0.018 -0.393 -0.115 -0.307 0.264 -0.086 0.071 -0.273 
Niunsegment 0.096 0.097 -0.031 0.063 -0.116 -0.051 -0.120 0.116 0.004 0.107 0.158 
Nwnfrgnseg 0.047 0.055 0.012 0.001 -0.056 -0.019 -0.054 0.053 -0.013 0.037 0.057 
Frgnsegrev 0.120 0.094 -0.012 0.095 -0.111 -0.151 -0.155 0.135 -0.020 0.171 0.096 
TABLE 3 (continued) 
Correlation Matrix: S~earman Correlations above Diagonal, Pearson Correlations below Diagonal 
BigN Office lnst Indepent Size Bookmk Num Numfrgn Frgnseg 
Variables Natexp Owner DT segment seg rev 
Local 0.216 0.044 0.137 0.107 0.171 0.058 0.122 0.047 0.121 
Nwnbign_MSA 0.166 0.038 -0.035 0.034 -0.054 -0.017 ' 0.120 0.052 0.086 
Numnonbign_MSA -0.010 0.081 -0.073 -0.028 -0.098 -0.069 0.053 0.036 0.027 
NumExp_MSA 0.069 0.215 -0.037 0.031 0.068 -0.036 0.113 0.016 0.121 
Leverage -0.126 -0.025 -0.134 -0.034 0.191 -0.172 -0.264 -0.086 -0.167 
Loss -0.189 -0.025 -0.130 -0.262 -0.450 -0.165 -0.059 . -0.019 -0.103 
Goingconcem -0.315 -0.042 -0.252 -0.162 -0.392 -0.308 -0.161 -0.054 -0.147 
ROA 0.241 0.040 0.121 0.288 0.373 0.013 0.216 0.074 0.214 
SOX302 -0.139 -0.004 -0.047 -0.074 -0.117 -0.074 -0.008 -0.013 -0.011 
00 Nafeeratio 0.264 0.035 0.036 0.148 0.211 0.083 0.126 0.040 0.158 
.j::.. 
Fee ratio -0.116 0.020 -0.074 -0.139 -0.520 -0.338 0.242 0.070 0.188 
Bign 0.123 0.108 0.342 0.513 0.030 0.285 0.095 0.285 
Officenatexp 0.123 -0.012 0.072 0.121 0.005 0.085 0.012 0.099 
Instowner -0.030 -0.024 -0.048 0.032 0.221 0.068 0.018 0.012 
Indepentdt 0.337 0.072 -0.113 0.503 -0.033 0.242 0.090 0.321 
Size 0.526 0.125 -0.082 0.487 0.197 0.154 0.033 0.282 
Bookmk 0.044 0.003 0.094 -0.004 0.159 -0.046 -0.025 -0.063 
Numsegment 0.218 0.089 -0.016 0.205 0.173 -0.013 0.264 0.840 
Numfrgnseg 0.095 0.012 -0.001 0.088 0.043 0.002 0.040 0.355 
Frgnsegrev 0.313 0.116 -0.072 0.382 0.391 -0.022 0.711 0.252 
00 
U\ 
TABLE 3 (continued) 
Correlation Matrix: Spearman Correlations above Diagonal, Pearson Correlations below Diagonal 
This table presents Spearman correlation above the diagonal and Pearson correlations below the diagonal for all 
variables in the location model. The total number of observations is 65,525. All variables are defined as in 
Appendix A. All numbers in bold present significant correlations at 5% level. 
TABLE4 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
Variables Predicted Coeff. Standard Chi-Square 
sign Error 
Intercept 
-1.559 0.964 2.61 2 
Availability of local 
auditors 
NumBigN_MSA 
-0.215 *** 0.019 123.597 
NwnnonBigN _MSA 
-0.002 * 0.001 2.762 
NumExp_MSA 
-0.143 *** 0.035 16.336 
Risk 
Leverage + -0.026 * 0.014 3.469 
Loss + 0.183 *** 0.044 17.433 
Goingconcem + 0.502 *** 0.067 57.155 
ROA 
-0.055 *** 0.016 12.223 
SOX302 + 0.135 ** 0.065 4.318 
Fee 
Nafeeratio 
-0.439 *** 0.063 48.992 
Auditfee 2.306 *** 0.663 12.102 
Control variables 
Bign +I-
-0.681 *** 0.072 90.223 
Officenatexp +1-
-0.063 0.186 0.113 
Instowner 
-12.194 *** 2.941 17.190 
Indepentdt 
-0.095 0.113 0.709 
Size +I-
-0.045 ** 0.022 4.087 
Bookmk 0.022 0.015 2.145 
Numsegment + -0.024 0.020 1.500 
Numfrgnseg + -0.131 0.085 2.367 
Frgnsegrev + 0.009 0.021 0.202 
Control for year and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 65,525 
No. of clusters 9,221 
Adjusted R2 16.71% 
Percent classified correctly 73.50% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 6870.3674 *** 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-
tailed tests). 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
This table presents results from the logistic regression estimating the likelihood of non-
local auditor-client relationship. The regression is: 
NonLocal = ~o + ~1NumBign_MSA + ~2NumnonBign_MSA + ~3NumExp_MSA + 
~¥,everage + ~sLoss+ ~6GoingConcem + ~7ROA+ ~gSOX302 + ~9Najeeratio + 
~lOAudiifee +~nBigN + ~12 Officenatexp + ~13/nstOwner + ~1JndepentDT + ~ 15Size + 
~ 16BookMK+ ~17Numsegment + ~1gNumjrgnseg + ~19Frgnsegrev + Industry and year 
dummies+ s 
NonLocal equals 1 if the auditor and the client are not in the same city or the same MSA 
and are farther away from each other more than 100 miles driving distance by Google 
Map. NumBigN_MSA =Number of Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan 
Statistical Areas where the firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA =Number of non-Big 4 
auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. 
NumExp_MSA =Number of top ten auditor offices with industry specialization at 
national level in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is 
located. The industry specialization is measured by total audit fees. Leverage = total 
liabilities/total assets. Loss = 1 if the firm reported net loss in the previous year, and 0 
otherwise. GoingConcern = 1 if the firm received a going concern audit opinion in the 
previous year, and 0 otherwise. ROA = net income/total assets. SOX302 = 1 if the firm 
reported internal control weaknesses under Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 302, 
and 0 otherwise. Nafeeratio = natural log of total non-audit fees/total audit fees. Audiifee 
= natural log of total audit fees/total assets. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 
auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist 
at national level, and 0 otherwise. InstOwner = total number of common shares owned 
by institutional investors/total number of common shares outstanding. IndepentDT = 
total number of independent directors /total number of directors. Size = natural log of 
total assets. BookMK =book value of owners' equity/ market value of the firm. 
Numsegment = number of geographic segments. Numfrgnseg = number of foreign 
segments. Frgnsegrev = natural log of total revenues from foreign segments. 
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TABLES 
Descriptive Statistics for Restatement Model 
Variable Non-local (N=10,909) Local (N=10,909) Diff. in t-value P-Value 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
Size 4.737 4.871 2.581 4.742 4.841 2.515 
-0.004 -0.120 0.902 
Leverage 1.130 0.619 2.350 1.102 0.618 2.317 0.027 0.870 0.384 
Boo lank 0.492 0.498 1.588 0.500 0.507 1.537 
-0.007 -0.350 0.727 
ROA -0.588 0.002 1.908 -0.559 0.005 1.905 
-0.029 -1.130 0.260 
Instowner 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.000 -0.350 0.726 
Indepentdt 0.072 0.000 0.186 0.069 0.000 0.183 0.003 1.040 0.299 
BigN 0.445 0.000 0.497 0.439 0.000 0.496 0.006 0.870 0.383 
Officenatexp 0.013 0.000 0.112 0.012 0.000 0.109 0.001 0.490 0.624 
This table presents descriptive statistics and univariate tests for the variables used in the logistic regression predicting 
the likelihood of restatement. Chi-square tests for BigN and Officenatexp show no significant difference in means 
between non-local and local restatement sample. Size = natural log of total assets. Leverage = total liabilities/total 
assets. BookMK =book value of owners' equity/ market value of the firm. ROA = net income/total assets. InstOwner 
= total number of common shares owned by institutional investors/total number of common shares outstanding. 
IndepentDT = total number of independent directors /total number of directors. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the 
Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 
otherwise. 
00 
\0 
Parameter 
Intercept 
Local 
Size 
Leverage 
· BookMK 
ROA 
Ins tOwner 
lndepentDT 
BigN 
Officenatexp 
TABLE6 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Restatement 
Estimate Standard Chi- Estimate Standard 
Error Square Error 
Subsequent restatement 
Chi-
Square 
(Misstatement) Current Restatement 
-2.436 0.804 9.193 -3.092 0.695 19.772 
-0.224*** 0.040 31.429 -0.168*** 0.047 12.774 
0.057*** 0.013 19.756 0.025* 0.015 2.772 
0.010 0.014 0.563 0.004 0.016 0.054 
0.013 0.015 0.774 0.003 0.017 0.036 
-0.036** 0.016 4.736 -0.023 0.019 1.450 
-13.305*** 2.982 19.914 -9.043*** 3.442 6.904 
-0.510*** 0.130 15.411 -0.877*** 0.162 29.146 
0.045 0.054 0.697 0.112* 0.063 3.151 
0.051 0.169 0.092 0.207 0.191 1.174 
Control for year and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 21,818 21,818 
No. of restatements 3,019 2,069 
Max-rescaled R2 5.51% 4.40% 
c 64.20% 63.60% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 673.8881 *** 55.5732*** 
\0 
0 
TABLE 6 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Restatement 
This table presents the results from the logistic regressions estimating the likelihood of restatement for propensity 
score-matched. sample. The first regression estimates the likelihood of misstatement or subsequent restatement. The 
second regression estimates the likelihood of restatement during the observation year. The model is: 
Restatement= ~o + /hLocal + fhSize + /hLeverage + f34Bookmk + fJsROA + /J6lnstowner + fJ7Indepentdt + 
fJsBigN + /J90fficenatexp + e 
Local= 1 if the auditor and the client are in the same city or the same MSA or located within 100 miles driving 
distance by Google Map from each other. Size = natural log of total assets. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. 
BookMK =book value of owners' equity/ market value of the firm. ROA = net income/total assets. InstOwner = 
total number of common shares owned by institutional investors/total number of common shares outstanding. 
IndepentDT = total number of independent directors /total number of directors. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the 
Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 
0 otherwise. 
1.0 
........ 
TABLE7 
DescriEtive Statistics for the Going Concern Model 
Variable Non-local (N=8,388) Local (N=8,388) Diff. in t-value P-Value 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
Zscore -11.278 1.681 59.779 -12.121 1.781 59.086 0.843 0.920 0.358 
Loss 0.560 1.000 0.496 0.570 1.000 0.495 -0.010 -1.310 0.191 
Leverage 1.217 0.547 2.616 1.193 0.516 2.635 0.024 0.600 0.550 
Mkcap 4.323 4.151 2.286 4.270 4.041 2.297 0.053 1.500 0.135 
Cash 2.175 1.842 1.861 2.143 1.733 1.871 0.033 1.140 0.255 
CurrentRT 2.795 1.578 4.135 2.792 1.673 3.747 0.004 0.060 0.953 
ROA -0.743 -0.031 2.110 -0.741 -0.026 2.161 
-0.002 -0.060 0.949 
REVT 3.852 3.911 2.697 3.842 3.750 2.582 0.009 0.230 0.821 
OANCF 72.880 0.653 250.083 82.136 0.695 303.431 
-9.256 -2.160 0.031 
BigN 0.453 0.000 0.498 0.454 0.000 0.498 
-0.002 -0.200 0.840 
Officenatexp 0.014 0.000 0.117 0.013 0.000 0.111 0.001 0.740 0.456 
This table presents descriptive statistics and univariate tests for the variables used in the logistic regression 
predicting the likelihood of a going concern audit opinion. Zscore is Altman's Z Score predicting the likelihood 
of bankruptcy. Loss = 1 if the firm reported net loss in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Leverage = total 
liabilities/total assets. Size = natural log of total assets. MKcap = natural log of the firm's market value. Cash = 
natural log of cash. CurrentRT = total current assets/total current liabilities. ROA = net income/total assets. REVT 
=natural log of total revenues.OANCF =cash flows from operating activities. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of 
the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national 
level, and 0 otherwise 
TABLES 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Issuing a Going Concern Report 
· Parameter Estimate Standard Chi-Square 
Error 
Intercept -1.605 7.839 0.042 
Local -0.139** 0.054 6.596 
Zscore 0.004*** 0.001 16.634 
Loss 1.175*** 0.077 232.004 
Leverage 0.234*** 0.028 70.123 
Mkcap -0.407*** 0.025 268.599 
Cash -0.187*** 0.037 26.171 
CurrentRT -0.189*** 0.012 245.910 
ROA -0.369*** 0.031 146.591 
REVT -0.410*** 0.022 358.112 
OANCF 0.001 * 0.001 2.729 
BigN 0.335*** 0.080 17.541 
Officenatexp 0.230 0.404 0.324 
Control for year and industry fixed effect 
No. of obs 16,776 
No. of going concern 3,848 
Adjusted R2 64.06% 
c 93.70% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 9207.67*** 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed 
tests). 
This table presents the results from the logistic regression predicting the likelihood of a 
going concern audit opinion. The model is: 
Going_concern =Po+ P1local + P2zscore + P3loss + P4leverage + Psmkcap + P6cash + 
P1currentrt + Psroa + P9revt + Pwoancf + PubigN +Pnofficenatexp + c 
Going_concern = 1 if the audit opinion is a going concern opinion, and 0 otherwise. 
Local = 1 if the auditor and the client are in the same city or the same MSA or located 
within 100 miles driving distance by Google Map from each other. Zscore is Altman's Z 
Score predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy. Loss= 1 if the firm reported net loss in the 
previous year, and 0 otherwise. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. Size = natural log 
of total assets. MKcap =natural log of the firm's market value. Cash= natural log of 
cash. CurrentRT = total current assets/total current liabilities. ROA = net income/total 
assets. REVT = natural log of total revenues. OANCF = cash flows from operating 
activities. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. 
Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 
otherwise. 
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TABLE9 
Descriptive Statistics for the Going Concern Report Accuracy Models 
Panel A: Descri~tive statistics for ~ro~ensit~ score-matched going concern o~inions (for Type I Error test) 
Non-local (N=1,434) Local (N=1,434) Diff. in t-value P-Value 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
Zscore -43 .693 -9.866 86.891 -53.723 -13.724 92.258 10.030 3.000 0.003 
Sales 0.637 0.625 2.679 0.863 0.956 2.649 
-0.226 -2.270 0.023 
Exch 0.054 0.000 0.225 0.036 0.000 0.187 0.017 2.250 0.024 
BigN 0.149 0.000 0.356 0.170 0.000 0.376 
-0.022 -1.580 0.114 
Officenatexp 0.006 0.000 0.075 0.008 0.000 0.087 
-0.002 -0.690 0.490 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for all propensity score-matched bankruptcies (for Type II Error test) 
1.0 
\.;.) 
Non-local (N=127) Non-local (N=127) Diff. in t-value P-Value 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
Zscore -8.380 -0.832 25.611 -15.832 -1.603 46.911 7.452 1.570 0.118 
Sales 4.270 4.772 2.629 3.710 3.891 2.715 0.560 1.670 0.096 
Exch 0.063 0.000 0.244 0.024 0.000 0.152 0.039 1.540 0.125 
BigN 0.465 0.000 0.501 0.520 1.000 · 0.502 
-0.055 -0.880 0.382 
Officenatexp 0.031 0.000 0.175 0.031 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.000 1.000 
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics for the Going Concern Report Accuracy Models 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for all propensity score-matched bankruptCies and delisted firms (for Type II 
Error test) 
Non-local (N=181) Non-local (N=181) Diff. in t-value P-Value 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
Zscore -5.710 -0.496 22.961 -10.871 -0.204 38.596 1.550 0.123 0.872 
Sales 3.898 4.252 2.579 3.394 3.466 2.314 1.960 0.051 0.354 
Exch 0.044 0.000 0.206 0.017 0.000 0.128 1.530 0.127 0.241 
BigN 0.453 0.000 0.499 0.431 0.000 0.497 0.420 0.673 0.179 
Officenatexp 0.028 0.000 0.164 0.028 0.000 0.164 0.000 1.000 0.000 
This table presents descriptive statistics and univariate tests for the variables used in the regression estimating the 
going concern report accuracy. Zscore is Altman's Z Score predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy. Sales = natural 
log of sales. Exch = 1 if the firm is listed on the New York or American Stock Exchange, and o otherwise. BigN = 1 if 
the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist 
at national level, and 0 otherwise. 
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TABLElO 
Likelihood of Issuing a Going Concern Opinion with Type I Error 
Panel A: Bankrul!_tcy 
Estimate Standard Chi- Estimate Standard 
Error Square Error 
Chi-
Square 
Parameter Bankru~tc~ within 1 ~ear Bankru~tc~ within 2 ~ears 
futercept -4.3650 0.2324 352.7111 -3.4485 0.1637 443.7728 
Local 0.0889 0.2129 0.1742 0.3138* 0.1636 3.6789 
Zscore -0.0011 0.0021 0.2870 0.0012 0.0016 0.5341 
Sales 0.4305*** 0.0548 61.6068 0.3016*** 0.0400 56.8139 
Exch -1.9424*** 0.6444 9.0864 -1.9479*** 0.5574 12.2127 
BigN 0.4712* 0.2574 3.3500 0.4916** 0.1984 6.1412 
Officenatexp 0.5307 0.7106 0.5577 1.1699** 0.5600 4.3642 
No. of obs 2,868 2,868 
No. of bankruptcy 101 177 
Adjusted R2 17.83% 14.00% 
c 79.80% 75.50% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 137.61 *** 152.90*** 
\0 
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TABLE 10 (continued) 
Likelihood of Issuing a Going Concern Opinion with Type I Error 
Panel B: Bankruptcy and delist 
Estimate Standard Chi-Square 
Error 
Estimate Standard 
Error 
Chi-Square 
Bankruptcy and delist Bankruptcy and delist 
Parameter within 1 ~ear within 2 ~ears 
Intercept -3 .694 0.183 406.348 -3 .031 0.140 466.715 
Local 0.198 0.176 1.262 0.344 ** 0.142 5.829 
Zscore 0.003 0.002 1.847 0.004 ** 0.002 4.770 
Sales 0.359 *** 0.044 65.386 0.294 *** 0.035 71.133 
Exch 
-2.299 *** 0.630 13.331 -2.399 *** 0.552 18.884 
BigN 0.606 *** 0.208 8.463 0.609 *** 0.170 12.839 
Officenatexp 0.541 0.634 0.727 1.030 * 0.546 3.565 
No. of obs 2,868 2,868 
No. of bankruptcy 153 247 
Adjusted R2 18.29% 17.27% 
c 80.40% 77.90% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 184.53 *** 228.73 *** 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
This table presents the results from the logistic regressions estimating the likelihood of bankruptcy for propensity score-
matched sample with going concern opinion. Panel A predicts the likelihood of bankruptcy and Panel B predicts the likelihood 
of bankruptcy and delisting. The model is: 
Bankrupt= flo + fJ1Local + fJ2Zscore + {J3Sales + {J4Exch + /l5BigN+fJ60Jficenatexp + c 
Local= 1 if the auditor and the client are in the same city or the same MSA or located within 100 miles driving distance from 
each other. Zscore is Altman's Z Score predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy. Sales = natural log of sales. Exch = 1 if the 
firm is listed on the New York or American Stock Exchange, and o otherwise. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 
auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 11 
Likelihood of Issuing an Opinion with Type II Error 
Estimate Standard 
Error 
Chi-
Square 
Estimate Standard 
Error 
Chi-Square 
Bankruptcy Bankruptcy and delisted 
Intercept 0.9576 0.3821 6.2806 0.5007 0.2709 3.4164 
Local -0.0777 0.2755 0.0795 -0.1744 0.2261 0.5953 
Zscore -0.0169 * 0.0102 2.7512 -0.0282 *** 0.00883 10.2198 
Sales -0.2575 *** 0.0774 11.0683 -0~ 1795 *** 0.0582 9.5159 
Exch -0.0202 0.727 0.0008 0.0626 0.7248 0.0075 
BigN 0.3017 0.3094 0.9512 0.0742 0.248 0.0896 
Officenatexp -0.6829 0.8909 0.5876 -0.4488 0.7987 0.3157 
No. of obs 254 362 
No. of going concern reports 134 174 
Adjusted R2 19.04% 15.81% 
c 72.60% 70.20% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 39.09 *** 45.66 *** 
***,**,*indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests) . 
This table presents the results from the logistic regressions estimating the likelihood of going concern opinion prior to the 
bankruptcy or delisting for propensity score-matched sample that went bankrupt or were delisted. The model is: 
Going_ Concern= fJ0 + fJ1local + fJ2zscore + /33Sales + f34Exch + /35BigN+f36ojficenatexp + e 
Local = 1 if the auditor and the client are in the same city or the same MSA or located within 100 miles driving distance 
from each other. Zscore is Altman's Z Score predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy. Sales= natural log of sales. Exch = 1 
if the firm is listed on the New York or American Stock Exchange, and o otherwise. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the 
Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 
otherwise. 
TABLE 12 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship with 
Alternative Financial Re~orting Risk Proxies 
Variables Predicted Chi- Chi- Chi-sign 
Coeff. Sguare Coeff. Sguare Coeff. Sguare 
Altman's Z Score Benish's M Score All risk ~roxies 
Intercept -0.582 0.336 -2.200* 2.807 -2.355* 3.168 
A vailabilit_y of local 
auditors 
NumBigN _MSA -0.226*** 101.351 -0.228*** 78.126 -0.229*** 77.796 
NumnonBigN _MSA -0.002* 3.276 -0.003* 3.004 -0.003* 2.707 
NumExp_MSA -0.122*** 9.764 -0.146*** 9.908 -0.153*** 10.462 
Risk 
Z Score 0.001 1.273 0.002 1.057 
M Score + 0.010* 3.366 0.010* 3.397 
Leverage + 0.020 0.504 
Loss + 0.176*** 13.509 0.185*** 12.081 0.178*** 11.059 
GoingConcern + 0.533*** 60.060 0.470*** 26.482 0.475*** 26.390 
ROA -0.078*** 22.092 -0.075*** 11.983 -0.088*** 10.580 
SOX302 + 0.147** 4.507 0.089 1.116 0.093 1.195 
Fee 
Nafeeratio -0.349*** 26.846 -0.284*** 12.135 -0.292*** 12.742 
Auditfee 0.528 0.554 1.797** 3.841 1.957** 4.297 
Control variables 
BigN . +1- -0.834*** 100.802 -0.899*** 89.946 -0.896***. 87.334 
Officenatexp +1- -0.015 0.006 -0.086 0.151 -0.063 0.080 
Ins tOwner -15.914*** 17.391 -16.363*** 12.168 -16.095*** 11.710 
lndepentDT -0.204 2.589 -0.305** 4.973 -0.320** 5.396 
Size +1- -0.011 0.181 0.067** 5.140 0.072** 5.650 
BookMK 0.017 1.220 0.014 0.502 0.015 0.540 
Numsegment + -0.023 1.339 -0.009 0.203 -0.009 0.184 
Numfrgnseg + -0.168* 3.650 -0.115 1.424 -0.117 1.470 
Frgnsegrev + -0.003 0.013 -0.018 0.560 -0.019 0.618 
Control for ~ear and industry fixed effect 
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TABLE 12 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship with 
Alternative Financial Reporting Risk Proxies 
Altman's Z Score Benish's M Score All risk proxies 
No. of observations 51,297 39,615 39,071 
No. of clusters 7,317 6,018 5,916 
Adjusted R2 18.48% 13.80% 13.82% 
Percent classified correctly 74.60% 72.20% 72.30% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 6025.76*** 3209.74*** 3171.22*** 
***,**,*indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
This table presents results from the logistic regression estimating the likelihood of non-
local auditor-client relationship with alternative financial reporting risk proxies. The first 
regression has Altman's Z score for prediction of a chance of bankruptcy as a proxy for 
firm's reporting risk. The second regression has Beneish's M Score predicting a chance of 
financial report manipulation as a proxy for firm's reporting risk. The third regression 
includes leverage Z Score and M Score as predictors. The calculations of Z Score and M 
Score are in the Appendix A. The regression is: NonLocal = ~0 + ~ 1NumBign_MSA + 
~2NumnonBign_MSA + ~3NumExp_MSA + ~J?isk Proxy+ ~sLoss+ ~6GoingConcern + 
~7ROA+ ~sSOX302 + ~gNafeeratio + ~!OAudiifee +~11BigN + ~12 Officenatexp + 
~ 13/nstOwner + ~ 1JndepentDT + ~15Size + ~16BookMK+ ~ 17Numsegment + 
~ 1 sNumfrgnseg + ~ 1gFrgnsegrev + Industry and year dummies+ E 
NonLocal equals 1 if the auditor and the client are not in the same city or the same MSA 
and are farther away from each other more than 100 miles driving distance by Google 
Map. NumBigN_MSA =Number of Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan 
Statistical Areas where the firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA =Number of non-Big 4 
auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. 
NumExp_MSA =Number of top ten auditor offices with industry specialization at 
national level in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is 
located. The industry specialization is measured by total audit fees. Risk Proxy includes 
Z Score, M Score, and leverage. Loss = 1 if the firm reported net loss in the previous 
year, and 0 otherwise. GoingConcern = 1 if the firm received a going concern audit 
opinion in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. ROA = net income/total assets. SOX302 = 
1 if the firm reported internal control weaknesses under Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
Section 302, and 0 otherwise. Nafeeratio = natural log of total non audit fees/total audit 
fees. auditfee = natural log of total audit fees/total assets. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of 
the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry 
specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise. InstOwner = total number of common shares 
owned by institutional investors/total number of common shares outstanding. 
IndepentDT = total number of independent directors /total number of directors. Size = 
natural log of total assets . BookMK =book value of owners' equity/ market value of the 
firm. Numsegment = number of geographic segments. Numfrgnseg = number of foreign 
segments. Frgnsegrev = natural log of total revenues from foreign segments. 
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TABLE 13 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
for 2003 - 2012 Fiscal Year Sam~le and SOX section 404 Sam~le 
Variables Predicted Standard Chi- Standard 
sign Chi-Coeff. Error Sguare Coeff. Error Sguare 
2003-2012 Sam~le SOX 404 Sam~le 
Intercept -0.491 0.975 0.253 -0.195 1.279 0.023 
Availability of local auditors 
NumBigN_MSA -0.243 *** 0.022 121.454 -0.315 *** 0.027 141.649 
NumNonBigN _MSA -0.003 ** 0.002 4.562 -0.001 0.002 0.444 
NumExp_MSA 
-0.132 *** 0.039 11.690 -0.132 *** 0.048 7.470 
Risk 
Leverage + -0.027 * 0.015 3.512 -0.016 0.020 0.665 
Loss + 0.146 *** 8.832 0.081 0.064 1.621 
GoingConcern + 0.554 *** 0.074 56.428 0.565 *** 0.107 27.772 
ROA -0.050 *** 0.017 9.100 -0.054 ** 0.024 5.204 
SOX302 + 0.152 ** 0.066 5.235 
SOX404 + 0.197 ** 0.077 6.621 
Fee 
NAfeeratio -0.456 *** 0.068 45.613 -0.454 *** 0.086 28.138 
Auditfee 1.496 ** 0.720 4.325 0.845 1.022 0.684 
Control 
variables 
BigN +1- -0.667 *** 0.080 68.906 -0.599 *** 0.102 34.496 
Officenatexp +1- -0.074 0.226 0.106 -0.047 0.266 0.032 
InstOwner -11.294 *** 3.126 13.055 -5.500 3.558 2.389 
IndepentDT -0.086 0.123 0.489 -0.009 0.130 0.005 
Size +I- -0.071 *** 0.024 8.864 -0.090 *** 0.030 8.916 
BookMK 0.016 0.016 0.905 0.005 0.020 0.058 
Numsegment + -0.028 0.021 1.724 -0.015 0.024 0.382 
Numfrgnseg + -0.176 * 0.097 3.325 -0.080 0.122 0.436 
Frgnsegrev + 0.008 0.022 0.120 -0.009 0.026 0.135 
Control for _year and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 50,630 30,248 
No. of clusters 8,174 6,143 
Adjusted R2 19.06% 20.20% 
Percent classified 
correctly 75.00% 76.10% 
6152.9 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 6 *** 3760.27 *** 
***, **, *indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 13 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
for 2003 - 2012 Fiscal Year Sample and SOX section 404 Sample 
This table presents results from the logistic regression estimating the likelihood of non-
local auditor-client relationship for subsample with fiscal year in 2003-2012 and 
SOX404 sample. The first regression includes all sample with fiscal year 2003-2012. 
The second regression includes all sample with SOX Section 404 report. The 
regressiOn 1s: 
NonLocal = ~o + ~~NumBign_MSA + ~2NumnonBign_MSA + ~3NumExp_MSA + 
~,J<isk Proxy+ ~5Loss+ ~6GoingConcern + ~7ROA+ ~8SOX302/SOX404 + 
~9Najeeratio + ~wAudiifee +~11BigN + ~12 Officenatexp + ~13/nstOwner + 
~1JndepentDT + ~1sSize + ~16BookMK+ ~nNumsegment + ~1sNumjrgnseg + 
~ 1 9Frgnsegrev + Industry and year dummies+ c 
NonLocal equals 1 if the auditor and the client are not in the same city or the same 
MSA and are farther away from each other more than 100 miles driving distance by 
Google Map. NumBigN_MSA =Number of Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or 
Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA =Number 
of non-Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the 
firm is located. NumExp_MSA =Number of top ten auditor offices with industry 
specialization at national level in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas 
where the firm is located. The industry specialization is measured by total audit fees. 
Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. Loss = 1 if the firm reported net loss in the 
previous year, and 0 otherwise. GoingConcern = 1 if the firm received a going concern 
audit opinion in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. ROA = net income/total assets. 
SOX302 = 1 if the firm reported internal control weaknesses under Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 Section 302, and 0 otherwise. SOX404 = 1 if the firm reported internal 
control weaknesses under Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 404, and 0 
otherwise.Nafeeratio = natural log of total non audit fees/total audit fees. audiifee = 
natural log of total audit fees/total assets. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 
auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry 
specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise. InstOwner = total number of common 
shares owned by institutional investors/total number of common shares outstanding. 
IndepentDT =total number of independent directors /total number of directors. Size= 
natural log of total assets. BookMK = book value of owners' equity/ market value of the 
firm. Numsegment = number of geographic segments. Numfrgnseg = number of foreign 
segments. Frgnsegrev = natural log of total revenues from foreign segments. 
Putting both SOX302 and SOX404 into the same model, only SOX302 has a significant 
positive relationship with the likelihood of non-local auditor-client relationship (the 
results are not reported here.) 
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TABLE 14 
Additional Descri~tive Statistics and Univariate Anal~sis for Misstatement Sam~le 
Variable Non-Local (N = 1,694) Local (N = 7,580) Diff. in t-value P-Value 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Means 
Restacct 0.934 1.000 0.248 0.952 1.000 0.214 -0.018 -2.690 0.007 
Restfraud 0.035 0.000 0.185 0.028 0.000 0.165 0.008 1.560 0.120 
Restclererr 0.043 0.000 0.202 0.040 0.000 0.197 0.002 0.400 0.688 
Restother 0.102 0.000 0.303 0.110 0.000 0.313 -0.008 -0.990 0.322 
Restadverse 0.848 1.000 0.359 0.857 1.000 0.350 -0.009 -0.950 0.340 
Restimprove 0.152 0.000 0.359 0.143 0.000 0.350 0.010 1.030 0.305 
Restdisctime 203.763 146.000 195.216 191.985 141.000 174.156 11.778 2.290 0.022 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the restatement types and restatement discovery time for 9,274 firm-
,_. year observations with misstatement. Restatement types are classified by Audit Analytics. Restacct is an indicator 
i3 variable that equals 1 if a firm-year observation was restated due to accounting rule application failures, and 0 
otherwise. Restfraud is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm-year observation was restated due to financial 
fraud, irregularities and misrepresentations, and 0 otherwise. Restclererr is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a 
firm-year observation was restated due to material accounting and clerical application errors, and 0 otherwise. 
Restother is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm-year observation was restated due to other significant 
issues, and 0 otherwise. Res tad verse is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the cumulative change in net income 
due to the restatement is negative, and 0 otherwise Restimprove is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
cumulative change in net income due to the restatement is negative, and 0 otherwise. Restdisctime is the number 
of days between the financial statement date and the restatement disclosure date. Chi-square tests for all 
categorical variables provide the same significant level as the in the t-tests. 
TABLE 15 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
for Big 4 and Non-Big 4 Sam~le 
Variables Predicted Std Chi- Std Chi-sign Coeff. Error Sguare Coeff. Error Sguare 
Big 4 Sam~le Non-Big 4 Sam~le 
Intercept -16.149*** 1.162 193.075 1.128 1.082 1.087 
Availability of local auditors 
NumBigN_MSA -0.335*** 0.026 169.395 -0.091 *** 0.026 12.464 
NumNonBigN _MSA 0.002 0.002 2.464 -0.007*** 0.002 17.257 
NumExp_MSA -0.083 0.051 2.671 -0.197*** 0.047 17.856 
Risk 
Leverage + 0.041 0.061 0.447 -0.029** 0.014 3.989 
Loss + 0.179*** 0.062 8.266 0.170*** 0.060 8.100 
GoingConcern + 0.214 0.142 2.275 0.472*** 0.077 37.366 
ROA -0.040 0.055 0.533 -0.051 *** 0.016 9.992 
SOX302 + -0.123 0.131 0.883 0.168** 0.078 4.606 
Fee 
NAfeeratio -0.312*** 0.107 8.576 -0.528*** 0.078 45.494 
Auditfee 4.610*** 1.219 14.314 1.067 0.790 1.821 
Control variables 
Officenatexp +1- -0.233 0.200 1.367 
OfficeMSAexp +1- -0.050 0.108 0.217 
Ins tOwner -19.898*** 6.776 8.623 -7.555*** 2.637 8.209 
IndepentDT -0.204 0.127 2.589 -0.418 0.388 1.157 
Size +1- 0.025 0.033 0.566 -0.102*** 0.031 10.894 
BookMK 0.027 0.026 1.093 0.025 0.018 1.965 
Numsegment + 0.016 0.022 0.519 -0.075** 0.035 4.452 
Numfrgnseg + -0.050 0.108 0.218 -0.155 0.134 1.335 
Frgnsegrev + -0.023 0.024 0.909 0.007 0.051 0.020 
Control for ~ear and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 43,113 22,412 
No. of clusters 6,588 4,105 
Adjusted R2 9.54% 15.82% 
Percent classified correctly 69.50% 70.70% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 2105.43 *** 2609.75 *** 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 15 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
for Big 4 and Non-Big 4 Sample 
This table presents results from the logistic regression estimating the likelihood of non-
local auditor-client relationship for subsample of Big 4 and non-Big 4. The regression 
IS: 
NonLocal = ~o + ~ 1NumBign_MSA + ~2NumnonBign_MSA + ~3NumExp_MSA + 
~~everage + ~sLoss+ ~6GoingConcem + ~7ROA+ ~sSOX302 + ~9Nafeeratio + 
~wAuditfee + ~11 Officenatexp/OfficeMSAexp + ~12/nstOwner + ~ 13/ndepentDT + 
~14Size + ~tsBookMK+ ~~~umsegment + ~17Nunifrgnseg + ~ 18Frgnsegrev + Industry 
and year dummies + E 
NonLocal is the distant auditor-client relationship defined as the relationship in which 
the auditor and the client are not in the same city or the same MSA and are farther away 
from each other more than 100 miles driving distance by Google Map. NumBigN_MSA 
= Number of Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where 
the firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA =Number of non-Big 4 auditors in the 
Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. NumExp_MSA 
= Number of top ten auditor offices with industry specialization at national level in the 
Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. The industry 
specialization is measured by total audit fees. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. 
Loss = 1 if the firm reported net loss in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. 
GoingConcern = 1 if the firm received a going concern audit opinion in the previous 
year, and 0 otherwise. ROA = net income/total assets. sox302 = 1 if the firm reported 
internal control weaknesses under Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 302, and 0 
otherwise. Nafeeratio = natural log of total non-audit fees/total audit fees. Auditfee = 
natural log of total audit fees/total assets. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 
auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist 
at national level, and 0 otherwise. OfficeMSAexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry 
specialist at MSA level, and 0 otherwise. InstOwner = total number of common shares 
owned by institutional investors/total number of common shares outstanding. 
IndepentDT = total number of independent directors /total number of directors. Size = 
natural log of total assets. BookMK =book value of owners' equity/ market value of the 
firm. Numsegment = number of geographic segments. Numfrgnseg = number of foreign 
segments. Frgnsegrev = natural log of total revenues from foreign segments. 
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TABLE16 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Restatement for Big 4 and Non- Big 4 Sample 
Panel A: Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Restatement for Big 4 Sam~le 
Standard Chi- Standard Chi-
Estimate Error Sguare Estimate Error Sguare 
Parameter Misstatement Restatement 
Iritercept -2.815 *** 0.398 50.004 -2.360 *** 0.545 18.761 
Local -0.050 0.044 1.309 -0.076 0.055 1.954 
Size 0.074 *** 0.010 57.766 0.030 ** 0.012 6.031 
Leverage 0.171 *** 0.037 21.866 0.204 *** 0.041 25.152 
Bookmk 0.082 *** 0.014 33.517 0.061 *** 0.018 11.206 
........ Roa 0.074 ** 0.040 3.405 -0.046 0.044 1.099 0 
VI Ins towner 0.159 2.140 0.006 8.223 *** 2.749 8.950 
Indepentdt -0.314 *** 0.064 23.871 -0.584 *** 0.082 50.336 
Officenatexp 0.319 *** 0.062 26.790 0.309 *** 0.074 17.392 
Control for ~ear and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 43,113 43,113 
No. of restatements 6,547 3,799 
Max-rescaled R2 5.98% 5.79% 
c 64.00% 66.00% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi~ 
square 1504.07 *** 1136.00 *** 
....... 
0 
0\ 
TABLE 16 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Restatement for Big 4 and Non- Big 4 Sample 
Panel B: Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Restatement for Non-Big 4 Sample 
Standard Chi- Standard 
Estimate Error Sguare Estimate Error 
Parameter . Misstatement Restatement 
Intercept -3 .193 *** 1.081 8.727 -1.049 0.721 
Local -0.296 *** 0.046 41.830 -0.259 *** 0.052 
Size 0.058 *** 0.014 16.166 0.028 * 0.016 
Leverage -0.019 0.012 2.281 -0.007 0.014 
Bookmk -0.022 0.015 2.310 -0.014 0.017 
Roa -0.051 *** 0.014 12.862 -0.037 ** 0.016 
Ins towner -18.389 *** 2.755 44.541 -14.134 *** 3.058 
lndepentdt -0.670 ** 0.274 5.983 -0.734 ** 0.317 
Officenatexp -9.471 144.300 0.004 -10.914 148.500 
Control for ~ear and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 22,412 22,412 
No. of restatements 2,727 2,021 
Max-rescaled R2 6.07% 4.95% 
c 65.60% 64.50% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 723.58 *** 509.50 *** 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
Chi-
Sguare 
2.115 
24.765 
3.097 
0.259 
0.677 
5.368 
21.359 
5.363 
0.005 
~ 
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TABLE 16 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Restatement for Big 4 and Non- Big 4 Sample 
This table presents the results from the logistic regressions estimating the likelihood of restatement for Big 4 sample in 
Panel A, and non-Big 4 sample in Panel B. The first regression estimates the likelihood of misstatement or subsequent 
restatement. The second regression estimates the likelihood of restatement during the observation year. The model is: 
Restatement= ~o + /JJLocal + fJ2Size + /33Leverage + f34Bookmk + fJsROA + /36/nstowner + fJ7/ndepentdt + 
fJsOfficenatexp + t: 
Local= 1 if the auditor and the client are in the same city or the same MSA or located within 100 miles driving distance 
by Google Map from each other. Size = natural log of total assets. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. BookMK = 
book value of owners' equity/ market value of the firm. ROA = net income/total assets. InstOwner = total number of 
common shares owned by institutional investors/total number of common shares outstanding. IndepentDT = total 
number of independent directors /total number of directors. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry 
specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise. 
TABLE 17 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Issuing a Going Concern Re~ort for Big 4 and Non - Big 4 Sam~le 
Parameter Estimate Standard Chi- Estimate Standard Chi-
Error Square Error Square 
Big4 Non-Big 4 
Intercept -13.075 164.500 0.006 -0.961 53.077 0.000 
Local -0.307 *** 0.090 11.537 -0.523 *** 0.052 102.256 
Zscore -0.022 *** 0.004 32.462 0.000 0.001 0.005 
Loss 1.472 *** 0.096 235.878 1.246 *** 0.068 334.366 
Leverage 0.675 *** 0.078 75.455 0.373 *** 0.028 179.836 
Mkcap -0.003 *** 0.000 242.775 -0.005 *** 0.001 95.865 
Cash 0.001 *** 0.000 9.500 -0.095 *** 0.008 147.554 
CurrentRT -0.299 *** 0.026 131.233 -0.119 *** 0.010 149.926 
ROA -0.867 *** 0.063 188.424 -0.428 *** 0.029 223.870 
....... REVT 0.000 * 0.000 3.566 -0.006 *** 0.001 79.751 0 
00 
OANCF 0.001 *** 0.000 27.094 -0.051 *** 0.004 160.078 
Officenatexp 0.026 0.198 0.018 7.935 219.400 0.001 
Control for }'ear and industry fixed effect 
No. of obs 34,200 16,765 
No. of going concern 1,304 4,717 
Adjusted R2 43.40% 61.26% 
c 94.10% 92.70% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 4375.22 *** 9305.52 *** 
***,**,*indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
....... 
0 
\0 
TABLE 17 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Issuing a Going Concern Report for Big 4 and Non - Big 4 Sample 
This table presents the results from the logistic regression predicting the likelihood of a going concern audit 
opinion for subsample of Big 4 and non-Big 4. The model is: 
Going_concern = Po+ P1local + P2zscore + P3loss + P4leverage + Psmkcap + P6cash + P7currentrt + Psroa + 
pgrevt + p 10oancj + P uofficenatexp + c 
Going_concern = 1 if the audit opinion is a going concern opinion,and 0 otherwise. Local = 1 if the auditor and 
the client are in the same city or the same MSA or located within 100 miles driving distance by Google Map from 
each other. Zscore is Altman's Z Score predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy. Loss= 1 ifthe firm reported net 
loss in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. Size = natural log of total assets. 
MKcap = natural log of the firm's market value. Cash = natural log of cash. CurrentRT = total current assets/total 
current liabilities. ROA = net income/total assets. REVT = natural log of total revenues.OANCF =cash flows from 
operating activities. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 
otherwise. 
TABLEtS 
Likelihood of Issuing a Going Concern Opinion with Type I Error 
Panel A: Big 4 Sam~le 
Parameter Estimate Std. Chi-
Error Square 
·Bankruptcy within 2 years 
Intercept -2.927*** 0.272 115.472 
Local 0.236 0.222 1.128 
Zscore -0.004 0.003 1.389 
Sales 0.287* ** 0.038 55.987 
Exch -1.524*** 0.322 22.357 
Officenatexp 1.086*** 0.373 8.473 
No. of obs 1,205 
No. of bankruptcy 197 
Adjusted R2 11 .06% 
c 70.30% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 81.29*** 
Panel B: Non- Big 4 Sam~le 
Parameter Estimate Std. Chi-
Error Square 
Bankruptcy within 2 years 
Intercept -3.503*** 0.168 436.031 
Local 0.410** 0.169 5.889 
Zscore 0.001 0.001 0.391 
Sales 0.294*** 0.042 50.001 
Exch -1.237* 0.723 2.924 
No. of obs 3,684 
No. of bankruptcy 186 
Adjusted R2 7.53% 
c 70.60% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 92.64*** 
Estimate Std. Chi-
Error Square 
Bankruptcy and delist within 2 
ears 
-2.012*** 0.224 80.884 
0.226 0.192 1.384 
0.001 0.003 0.078 
0.185*** 0.032 32.802 
-1.671 *** 0.311 28.912 
0.892** 0.353 6.398 
1,205 
270 
8.29% 
66.00% 
67.25*** 
Estimate Std. Chi-
Error Square 
Bankruptcy and delist within 2 
ears 
-3 .218*** 0.149 464.295 
0.453*** 0.148 9.340 
0.002* 0.001 3.062 
0.331 *** 0.037 79.777 
-1.642** 0.723 5.151 
3,684 
254 
11.11 % 
73.70% 
165.12*** 
***,**, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 18 (continued) 
Likelihood of Issuing a Going Concern Opinion with Type I Error for Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 subsample · 
This table presents the results from the logistic regressions estimating the likelihood of 
bankruptcy subsample of Big 4 in Panel A and non-Big 4 in Panel B with going concern 
opinion. The model is: 
Bankrupt= flo+ fJ1Local + fJ2Zscore + /33Sales + f34Exch + /350jficenatexp + E: 
Local = 1 if the auditor and the client are in the same city or the same MSA or located 
within 100 miles driving distance from each other. Zscore is Altman's Z Score predicting 
the likelihood of bankruptcy. Sales= natural log of sales. Exch = 1 if the firm is listed on 
the New York or American Stock Exchange, and o otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the 
auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise 
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TABLE 19 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship for 
Unigue Firm Observations 
Std Chi- Std Chi-
Predicted Coeff. Error Sguare Coeff. Error Sguare 
Variables sign Audit Fee Sam_Qle Abnormal Audit Fee Sam_Qle 
Intercept 0.092 1.480 0.004 -10.212 235.100 0.002 
Availability of local auditors 
NumBigN_MSA -0.301 *** 0.020 228.694 -0.341 *** 0.023 219.060 
NumNonBigN _MSA -0.001 0.002 0.374 0.000 0.002 0.039 
NumExp_MSA -0.158*** 0.037 18.181 -0.136*** 0.044 9.723 
Risk 
Leverage + -0.016 0.018 0.806 -0.010 0.021 0.209 
Loss + 0.092 0.073 1.595 0.038 0.083 0.210 
GoingConcem + 0.564*** 0.100 32.116 0.506*** 0.113 20.101 
ROA -0.076*** 0.022 11.918 -0.083*** 0.025 10.914 
SOX302 + 0.217** 0.100 4.700 0.123 0.116 1.128 
Fee 
NAfeeratio -0.419*** 0.080 27.145 -0.328*** 0.092 12.752 
Auditfee -0.406 0.807 0.254 
Abnlfee -0.067 0.053 1.643 
Control variables 
BigN +1- -0.727*** 0.084 75.386 -0.909*** 0.094 93.192 
Officenatexp +1- -0.215 0.309 0.485 -0.090 0.327 0.075 
Ins tOwner -6.976** 2.766 6.359 -13.099*** 3.747 12.223 
lndepentDT -0.223 0.255 0.766 -0.371 0.281 1.743 
Size +1- -0.084*** 0.025 11.418 -0.029 0.026 1.272 
BookMK 0.019 0.018 1.134 0.037* 0.020 3.217 
Numsegment + -0.053** 0.025 4.515 -0.059** 0.027 4.775 
Numfrgnseg + -0.222** 0.110 4.079 -0.211 * 0.115 3.356 
Frgnsegrev + 0.030 0.025 1.491 0.009 0.027 0.126 
Control for ~ear and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 9,221 7,284 
Adjusted R2 23.31% 23.02% 
Percent classified correctly 77.40% 77.80% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 1444.93*** 1107.74*** 
***,**,*indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 19 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
for Unique Firm Observations 
This table presents results from the logistic regression estimating the likelihood of non-
local auditor-client relationship for the most recent audit opinion for each unique firm 
sample. The regression is: 
NonLocal = ~o + ~~NumBign_MSA + ~2NumnonBign_MSA + ~3NumExp_MSA + 
~4Leverage + ~sLoss+ ~6GoingConcern + ~7ROA+ ~sSOX302 + ~9Najeeratio + 
~wAuditfee!Abnlfee +~nBigN + ~12 Officenatexp + ~13/nstOwner + ~1JndepentDT + 
~1sSize + ~16BookMK+ ~17Numsegment + ~1sNumjrgnseg + ~19Frgnsegrev + Industry 
and year dummies + s 
NonLocal equals 1 if the auditor and the client are not in the same city or the same MSA 
and are farther away from each other more than 100 miles driving distance by Google 
Map. NumBigN_MSA =Number of Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan 
Statistical Areas where the firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA =Number of non-Big 4 
auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. 
NumExp_MSA =Number of top ten auditor offices with industry specialization at 
national level in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is 
located. The industry specialization is measured by total audit fees. Leverage = total 
liabilities/total assets. Loss = 1 if the firm reported net loss in the previous year, and 0 
otherwise. GoingConcern = 1 if the firm received a going concern audit opinion in the 
previous year, and 0 otherwise. ROA = net income/total assets. SOX302 = 1 if the firm 
reported internal control weaknesses under Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 302, and 
0 otherwise. Nafeeratio = natural log of total non-audit fees/total audit fees. Auditfee = 
natural log of total audit fees/total assets. Abnlfee = residual from audit fee regressions. 
BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if 
the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise. InstOwner = 
total number of common shares owned by institutional investors/total number of common 
shares outstanding. IndepentDT = total number of independent directors /total number of 
directors. Size= natural log of total assets. BookMK =book value of owners' equity/ 
market value of the firm. Numsegment = number of geographic segments. Numfrgnseg = 
number of foreign segments. Frgnsegrev = natural log of total revenues from foreign 
segments. 
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TABLE20 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship for 
Subsam~les with A vailabilit~ of Local Auditors 
Variables Predict Coeff. Chi- Coeff. Chi- Coeff. Chi-
ed sign Square Square Square 
Sample with at least Non-Big 4 Sample Big 4 Sample with 
one local auditor with local auditors local auditors 
available available 
Intercept -0.741 0.423 4.426*** 6.684 -17.119*** 196.578 
A vailabilitl:: of local auditors 
NumBigN_MSA -0.297 *** 56.233 -1.056*** 23.523 -0.224*** 7.517 
NumNonBigN _MSA -0.003** 4.948 -0.003 * 2.737 0.001 0.688 
NumExp_MSA -0.119*** 10.827 -0.173 *** 10.354 -0.054 1.068 
Risk 
Leverage + -0.030** 4.074 -0.030* 2.717 0.009 0.020 
Loss + 0.225*** 20.879 0.198** 5.243 0.241 *** 11.664 
Going Concern + 0.497*** 50.124 0.414*** 16.307 0.307** 4.721 
ROA -0.055 *** 10.801 -0.048** 5.609 -0.037 0.451 
SOX302 + 0.140* 3.788 0.130 1.400 -0.058 0.149 
Fee 
NAfeerati.o -0.371 *** 29.612 -0.321 *** 9.381 -0.198 2.539 
Auditfee 1.884*** 6.773 -1.165 1.240 5.025*** 13.183 
Control variables 
BigN +1- -0.800*** 97.865 
Officenatexp +1- -0.261 1.543 -0.406* 3.011 
OfficeMSAexp +1- 1.019*** 26.845 
Officecityexp +1- 0.003 0.001 
Ins tOwner -15.385*** 15.686 -9.383** 3.934 -26.211 *** 7.999 
lndepeniDT -0.271 ** 4.323 -1.086 1.970 -0.388*** 6.945 
Size +1- -0.069*** 7.700 -0.205*** .19.919 0.006 0.026 
BookMK 0.037** 4.921 0.025 0.973 0.056** 3.558 
Numsegment + -0.029 1.880 -0.073 1.781 0.019 0.646 
Numfrgnseg + -0.141 2.265 -0.100 0.310 -0.043 0.131 
Frgnsegrev + 0.027 1.353 0.047 0.361 -0.013 0.235 
Control for ~ear and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 55,684 11,865 37,126 
No. of clusters 8,048 2,400 5,736 
Adjusted R2 16.97% 17.71 % 5.68% 
Percent classified correctly 73.60% 73 .00% 65.60% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 5593.84*** 1469.82*** 945.23*** 
***,**, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed 
tests). 
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TABLE 20 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship for 
Subsamples with Availability of Local Auditors 
This table presents results from the logistic regression estimating the likelihood of non-
local auditor-client relationship for subsample with local auditor available. The first 
regression excludes firms that are located outside Metropolitan or Metropolitan Statistical 
Area or there is no local Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditor available locally. The second 
regression excludes firms located in the area where there are fewer than 12 non-Big 4 
auditors (the median numbers of non-Big 4 in MSA in the full sample). All observations are 
non-Big 4 clients only. The last regression excludes firms located in the area where there 
are fewer than 2 Big 4 auditors (the lower quartile and median numbers of Big 4 in MSA in 
the full sample is 4). All observations are Big 4 clients only. The model is: 
NonLocal = ~o + ~1NumBign_MSA + ~2NumnonBign_MSA + ~3NumExp_MSA + 
~4Leverage + ~5Loss+ ~6GoingConcern + ~7ROA+ ~sSOX302 + ~9Najeeratio + ~10Audiifee 
+~11BigN + ~12 Industry expertise dummy + ~13InstOwner + ~1JndepentDT + ~ 1 5Size + 
~1 6BookMK+ ~nNumsegment + ~1sNumjrgnseg + ~1 9Frgnsegrev + Industry and year 
dummies+ E 
NonLocal equals 1 if the auditor and the client are not in the same city or the same MSA 
and are farther away from each other more than 100 miles driving distance by Google Map. 
NumBigN _MSA = Number of Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical 
Areas where the firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA =Number of non-Big 4 auditors in the 
Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. NumExp_MSA = 
Number of top ten auditor offices with industry specialization at national level in the 
Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. The industry 
specialization is measured by total audit fees. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. Loss = 
1 if the firm reported net loss in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Going Concern = 1 if 
the firm received a going concern audit opinion in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. ROA 
= net income/total assets. SOX302 = 1 if the firm reported internal control weaknesses 
under Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 302, and 0 otherwise. Nafeeratio = natural log 
of total non-audit fees/total audit fees. Audiifee = natural log of total audit fees/total assets. 
BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Industry expertise 
dummy includes Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national 
level, and 0 otherwise, OfficeMSAexp= 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at 
MSA level, and 0 otherwise, and Officecityexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry 
specialist at city level, and 0 otherwise. InstOwner = total number of common shares 
owned by institutional investors/total number of common shares outstanding. IndepentDT = 
total number of independent directors /total number of directors. Size = natural log of total 
assets. BookMK = book value of owners' equity/ market value of the firm. Numsegment = 
number of geographic segments. Numfrgnseg = number of foreign segments. Frgnsegrev = 
natural log of total revenues from foreign segments. 
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TABLE21 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
for the First Firm-Year Observation after an Auditor Change 
Variables Predicted sign Coeff. Standard Chi-
Error Square 
Intercept 0.575 1.045 0.303 
Availability of local auditors 
NumBigN _MSA -0.155*** 0.026 34.890 
NumNonBigN _MSA -0.005** 0.002 5.706 
NumExp_MSA -0.191 *** 0.051 14.318 
Risk 
Leverage + -0.005 0.020 0.054 
Loss + 0.118 0.087 1.836 
GoingConcern + 0.437*** 0.104 17.704 
ROA -0.063 *** 0.023 7.249 
SOX302 + -0.259** Oo117 4.867 
Fee 
NAfeeratio -0.555*** 0.090 37.772 
Auditfee -0.718 0.839 0.733 
Control variables 
BigN +I- -0.676*** 0.117 33.702 
Officenatexp +1- 0.367 0.446 0.679 
Ins tOwner -9.080** 4.418 4.224 
IndepentDT 0.036 0.236 0.024 
Size +1- -0.128*** 0.031 16.800 
BookMK -0.009 0.025 0.126 
Numsegment + -0.006 0.027 0.057 
Numfrgnseg + -0.222 0.135 2.687 
Frgnsegrev + 0.028 0.037 0.564 
Control for year and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 5,963 
No. of clusters 4,074 
Adjusted R2 20.76% 
Percent classified 
correctly 74.70% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 895.00*** 
***,**, *indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed 
tests). 
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TABLE 21 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
for the First Firm-Year Observation after an Auditor Change 
This table presents results from the logistic regression estimating the likelihood of non-
local auditor-client relationship for subsample with auditor change. The model is: 
NonLocal =Po+ P1NumBign_MSA + P2NumnonBign_MSA + P3NumExp_MSA + 
p~everage + PsLoss+ P6GoingConcern + P1ROA+ PsSOX302 + P9Najeeratio + 
PwAudiifee +PnBigN + P1 2 Officenatexp + P13InstOwner + P1JndepentDT + ~ 15Size + 
P16BookMK+ Pn Numsegment + P1 sNumjrgnseg + P19Frgnsegrev + Industry and year 
dummies+ a 
NonLocal equals 1 if the auditor and the client are not in the same city or the same 
MSA and are farther away from each other more than 100 miles driving distance by 
Google Map. NumBigN-,MSA =Number of Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or 
Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA =Number 
of non-Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the 
firm is located. NumExp_MSA =Number of top ten auditor offices with industry 
specialization at national level in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas 
where the firm is located. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. Loss = 1 if the firm 
reported net loss in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. GoingConcern = 1 if the firm 
received a going concern audit opinion in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. ROA =net 
income/total assets. SOX302 = 1 if the firm reported internal control weaknesses under 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 302, and 0 otherwise. Nafeeratio = natural log of 
total non-audit fees/total audit fees. Audiifee = natural log of total audit fees/total assets. 
BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if 
the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise. InstOwner 
= total number of common shares owned by institutional investors/total number of 
common shares outstanding. IndepentDT = total number of independent directors /total 
number of directors. Size =natural log of total assets. BookMK =book value of owners' 
equity/ market value of the firm. Numsegment = number of geographic segments. 
Numfrgnseg = number of foreign segments. Frgnsegrev = natural log of total revenues 
from foreign segments. 
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TABLE22 
OLS Regression on the Distance between Auditors and Clients 
Predicted Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Variables sign Full Sam~Ie Non-Big 4 Sam~Ie Big 4 Sam~Ie 
Intercept 0.836 1.420 3.629*** 3.190 -1.330** -2.280 
Availability of local 
auditors 
NumBigN_MSA -0.163*** -9.280 -0.091 *** -3.080 -0.208*** -9.780 
NumNonBigN _MS 
A -0.001 -0.790 -0.005*** -3 .040 0.002* 1.930 
NumExp_MSA -0.105 *** -4.570 -0.217*** -5 .090 -0.046* -1.730 
Risk 
Leverage + -0.027 -1.410 -0.043** -2.100 0.023 0.440 
Loss + 0.137*** 4.200 0.178*** 2.850 0.101*** 2.850 
GoingConcern + 0.766*** 9.370 0.713*** 6.850 0.222* 1.960 
ROA -0.116*** -5.420 -0.097*** -4.130 -0.085 * -1.740 
SOX302 + 0.160** 2.330 0.235** 2.320 -0.073 -1.040 
Fee 
NAfeeratio -0.369*** -6.610 -0.593*** -6.590 -0.157** -2.440 
Auditfee 2.205*** 3.790 1.199 1.260 2.938*** 4.090 
Control variables 
BigN +1- -0.571 *** -9.900 
Officenatexp +1- 0.032 0.410 -0.122 -1.440 
OfficeMSAexp +1- -0.083 -0.700 
Ins tOwner -9.237*** -6.200 -7 .378*** -3.850 -8.226*** -3.780 
IndepentDT 0.025 0.400 -0.126 -0.500 -0.107* -1.680 
Size +1- -0.049*** -2.890 -0.158*** -4.610 0.018 0.930 
BookMK 0.024* 1.720 0.029 1.280 0.024 1.490 
Numsegment + -0.027** -2.420 -0.081 *** -3 .170 0.007 0.560 
Numfrgnseg + -0.114** -2.050 -0.180 -1.360 -0.023 -0.410 
Frgnsegrev + 0.030** 2.510 0.048 1.150 -0.007 -0.540 
Control for ~ear and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 65,466 22,389 43,077 
No. of clusters 9,215 4,099 6,584 
R2 11.65% 12.46% 4.39% 
Model F-Value 24.31 *** 14.48*** 8.40*** 
***, **, *indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 22 (continued) 
OLS Regression on the Distance between Auditors and Clients 
This table presents results from the OLS regression estimating the auditor-client 
distance. The model is: 
Distance= ~o + ~,NumBign_MSA + ~zNumnonBign_MSA + ~3NumExp_MSA + 
~~everage + ~sLoss+ ~6GoingConcern + ~7ROA+ ~8SOX302 + ~9Nafeeratio + 
~wAudiifee +~11BigN + ~12 Officenatexp + ~13/nstOwner + ~,,JndepentDT + ~15Size 
+ ~~~ookMK+ ~17Numsegment + ~18Numjrgnseg + ~19Frgnsegrev + Industry and 
year dummies + 8 
Distance= natural log of driving distance in miles between the auditor and the client. 
If the auditor and the client are in the same city or the same MSA, Distance =0. 
NumBigN_MSA =Number of Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan 
Statistical Areas where the firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA =Number of non-Big 
4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is 
located. NumExp_MSA =Number of top ten auditor offices with industry 
specialization at national level in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas 
where the firm is located. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. Loss = 1 if the firm 
reported net loss in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. GoingConcern = 1 if the firm 
received a going concern audit opinion in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. ROA = 
net income/total assets. SOX302 = 1 if the firm reported internal control weaknesses 
under Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 302, and 0 otherwise. Nafeeratio = natural 
log of total non-audit fees/total audit fees. Audiifee = natural log of total audit 
fees/total assets. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. 
Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 
otherwise. InstOwner = total number of common shares owned by institutional 
investors/total number of common shares outstanding. IndepentDT = total number of 
independent directors /total number of directors. Size = natural log of total assets. 
BookMK =book value of owners' equity/ market value of the firm. Numsegment = 
number of geographic segments. Numfrgnseg = number of foreign segments. 
Frgnsegrev = natural log of total revenues from foreign segments. 
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TABLE23 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship with 
Alternative Auditor lndustr;y S~ecialization Proxies 
Variables Predicted Std Chi- Std Chi-
sign Coeff. Error Sguare Coeff. Error Sguare 
National Level MSA Level 
Intercept -1.396 0.981 2.028 -1.552 0.964 2.593 
A vailabili!l: of local auditors 
NumBigN_MSA -0.215*** 0.019 123.774 -0.215*** 0.019 123.867 
NumNonBigN_MSA -0.002* 0.001 2.736 -0.002* 0.001 2.828 
NumExp_MSA -0.148*** 0.035 18.180 -0.150*** 0.037 16.624 
Risk 
Leverage + -0.024* 0.014 3.101 -0.026* 0.014 3.472 
Loss + 0.180*** 0.044 16.906 0.182*** 0.044 17.327 
GoingConcern + 0.506*** 0.067 57.690 0.504*** 0.066 57.562 
ROA -0.055*** 0.016 12.490 -0.055*** 0.016 12.269 
SOX302 + 0.134** 0.065 4.237 0.135** 0.065 4.282 
Fee 
NAfeeratio -0.439*** 0.063 49.017 -0.438*** 0.063 48.999 
Auditfee 2.149*** 0.677 10.064 2.281 *** 0.662 11.870 
Control variables 
BigN +1- -0.707*** 0.076 87.183 -0.679*** 0.071 90.657 
Office_nat_exp +1- 0.000 0.000 1.079 
Office_MSA_exp +1- 0.000 0.000 0.469 
Ins tOwner -12.298*** 2.955 17.321 -12.215*** 2.940 17.267 
lndepentDT -0.088 0.114 0.597 -0.097 0.113 0.739 
Size +1- -0.053** 0.023 5.170 -0.044** 0.022 3.917 
BookMK 0.022 0.015 2.220 0.022 0.015 2.190 
Numsegment + -0.025 0.020 1.588 -0.024 0.020 1.510 
Numfrgnseg + -0.130 0.085 2.337 -0.131 0.085 2.359 
Frgnsegrev + 0.010 0.021 0.238 0.009 0.021 0.194 
Control for ~ear and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 65,525 65,525 
No. of clusters 9,221 9,221 
Adjusted R2 16.72% 16.71% 
Percent classified correctly 73.50% 73.50% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 6875.53*** 6872.69*** 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 23 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
with Alternative Auditor Industry Specialization Proxies 
This table presents results from the logistic regression estimating the likelihood of non-
local auditor-client relationship with alternative industry specialization proxies as 
continuous variables. The model is: 
NonLocal = ~o + ~1NumBign_MSA + ~zNumnonBign_MSA + ~3NumExp_MSA + 
~~everage + ~sLoss+ ~6GoingConcern + ~1ROA+ ~8SOX302 + ~gNafeeratio + 
~wAuditfee +~nBigN + ~12 Office_nat_exp!Office_MSA_exp + ~13/nstOwner + 
~ 1JndepentDT + ~1sSize + ~16BookMK+ ~17Numsegment + ~ 18Numfrgnseg + 
~ 19Frgnsegrev + Industry and year dummies + 8 
NonLocal equals 1 if the auditor and the client are not in the same city or the same MSA 
and are farther away from each other more than 100 miles driving distance by Google 
Map. NumBigN_MSA =Number of Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan 
Statistical Areas where the firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA =Number of non-Big 4 
auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. 
NumExp_MSA =Number of top ten auditor offices with industry specialization at 
national level in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is 
located. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. Loss = 1 if the firm reported net loss in 
the previous year, and 0 otherwise. GoingConcern = 1 if the firm received a going 
concern audit opinion in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. ROA = net income/total 
assets. SOX302 = 1 if the firm reported internal control weaknesses under Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 Section 302, and 0 otherwise. Nafeeratio =natural log of total non 
audit fees/total audit fees. Auditfee = natural log of total audit fees/total assets. BigN = 1 
if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Office_nat_exp= rank of 
industry expertise at national level. Office_MSA_exp= rank of industry expertise at MSA 
level. InstOwner =total number of common shares owned by institutional investors/total 
number of common shares outstanding. IndepentDT = total number of independent 
directors /total number of directors. Size = natural log of total assets. BookMK = book 
value of owners' equity/ market value of the firm. Numsegment =number of geographic 
segments. Numfrgnseg = number of foreign segments. Frgnsegrev = natural log of total 
revenues from foreign segments. 
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TABLE24 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship with 
Alternative Audit Fee Proxies 
Variables Predicted Chi- Chi- Chi-
sign Coeff. Sguare Coeff. Sguare Coeff. Sguare 
Abnormal Fee Total Fee Non Audit Fee 
Intercept -0.201 0.050 -1.431 2.235 -3.533*** 10.413 
A vailabilit:y: of local auditors 
NumBigN_MSA -0.241 *** 127.291 -0.210*** 118.655 -0.218*** 107.862 
NumNonBigN_MSA ~0.003** 4.166 -0.002 2.454 -0.001 0.286 
NumExp_MSA -0.112*** 8.009 -0.143*** 16.435 -0.147*** 13.261 
Risk 
Leverage + -0.001 0.002 -0.025* 3.162 -0.042** 4.685 
Loss + 0.183*** 15.163 0.195*** 19.949 0.155*** 10.028 
GoingConcern + 0.538*** 56.414 0.524*** 61.850 0.400*** 24.532 
ROA -0.081 *** 22.516 -0.060*** 14.300 -0.055** 6.007 
SOX302 + 0.078 1.218 0.154** 5.605 0.119 1.998 
Fee 
NAfeeratio -0.372*** 29.793 
Abnlfee 0.071 ** 4.801 
Totalfee 1.823*** 8.393 
Auditfee 4.439*** 30.506 
Nonauditfee -0.164 0.211 
Control variables 
BigN +1- -0.815*** 105.664 -0.681 *** 91.408 -0.715*** 76.951 
Officenatexp +1- -0.047 0.057 -0.075 0.164 -0.123 0.410 
lnstOwner -17.006*** 18.895 -12.526*** 17.612 -13.161 *** 16.523 
IndepentDT -0.171 1.949 -0.085 0.558 -0.203* 2.881 
Size +I- -0.012 0.284 -0.065*** 9.142 -0.003 0.013 
BookMK 0.030* 3.169 0.021 1.920 0.030 2.527 
Numsegment + -0.025 1.421 -0.023 1.436 -0.012 0.375 
Numfrgnseg + -0.142 2.579 -0.126 2.228 . -0.065 0.497 
Frgnsegrev + -0.003 0.017 0.006 0.091 -0.01 2 0.283 
Control for _year and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 55,046 . 65,525 52,508 
No. of clusters 7,676 9,221 8,425 
Adjusted R2 17.16% 16.25% 12.54% 
Percent classified correctly 74.10% 73.30% 71.40% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 5898.95*** 6670.04*** 3837.70*** 
***,**,*indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 24 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
with Alternative Audit Fee Proxies 
This table presents results from the logistic regression estimating the likelihood of non-
local auditor-client relationship with alternative financial audit fee proxies. The first 
regression has abnormal audit fee as a predictor. The second regression has total fees and 
the third regression includes audit fee and non- audit fee as predictors. The calculations 
of abnormal fee in the Appendix A. The regression is: 
NonLocal = ~o + ~~NumBign_MSA + ~2NumnonBign_MSA + ~3NumExp_MSA + 
~~everage + ~5Loss+ ~6GoingConcern + ~7ROA+ ~8SOX302 + ~9Nafeeratio + 
~IOAudiifee proxies +~11BigN + ~1 2 Officenatexp + ~13/nstOwner + ~ 1JndepentDT + 
~IsSize + ~~~ookMK+ ~nNumsegment + ~I8Numfrgnseg + ~ 19Frgnsegrev + Industry 
and year dummies + 8 
NonLocal equals 1 if the auditor and the client are not in the same city or the same MSA 
and are farther away from each other more than 100 miles driving distance by Google 
Map. NumBigN_MSA =Number of Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan 
Statistical Areas where the firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA =Number of non-Big 4 
auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. 
NumExp_MSA =Number of top ten auditor offices with industry specialization at 
national level in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is 
located. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. Loss = 1 if the firm reported net loss in 
the previous year, and 0 otherwise. GoingConcern = 1 if the firm received a going 
concern audit opinion in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. ROA = net income/total 
assets. SOX302 = 1 if the firm reported internal control weaknesses under Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 Section 302, and 0 otherwise. Nafeeratio = natural log of total non 
audit fees/total audit fees. Abnlfee = residual from audit fee regressions. Totalfee = 
natural log of total audit fees + non-audit fees deflated by total assets. Audiifee :=::: natural 
log of total audit fees/total assets. Nonaudiifee= natural log of total non-audit fees/total 
assets. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp 
= 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise. 
InstOwner = total number of common shares owned by institutional investors/total 
number of common shares outstanding. IndepentDT = total number of independent 
directors /total number of directors. Size = natural log of total assets. BookMK = book 
. value of owners' equity/ market value of the firm. Numsegment =number of geographic 
segments. Numfrgnseg = number of foreign segments. Frgnsegrev = natural log of total 
revenues from foreign segments. 
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TABLE25 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
for Small and Large Firm Sam~Ie 
Variables Predicted Standard Chi- Standard Chi-
sign Coeff. Error Sguare Coeff. Error Sguare 
Small Firm Sam~Ie Large Firm Sam~Ie 
Intercept 9.309*** 1.145 66.125 -9.043*** 1.817 24.772 
A vailabiliti of local auditors 
NumBigN_MSA -0.093*** 0.031 8.848 -0.439*** 0.044 99.657 
NumNonBigN_MSA -0.005** 0.002 6.462 0.002 0.003 0.283 
NumExp_MSA -0.169*** 0.051 10.782 -0.243*** 0.091 7.200 
Risk 
Leverage + -0.020 0.014 1.956 -0.473 0.360 1.720 
Loss + 0.169** 0.075 5.140 0.245** 0.106 5.378 
GoingConcern + 0.521 *** 0.073 50.628 0.105 0.331 0.101 
ROA -0.050*** 0.016 10.452 -0.620*** 0.238 6.786 
SOX302 + 0.174* 0.093 3.520 -0.368 0.239 2.379 
Fee 
NAfeeratio -0.494*** 0.089 30.739 -0.807*** 0.177 20.826 
Auditfee 1.690** 0.760 4.945 5.341 ** 2.225 5.762 
Control variables 
BigN +1- -0.737*** 0.112 43.722 -0.329 0.220 2.242 
Officenatexp +1- 0.081 0.605 0.018 0.274 0.291 0.887 
Ins tOwner -9.578*** 3.606 7.055 12.406* 7.088 3.064 
IndepentDT -1.815 1.611 1.270 -0.157 0.174 0.810 
BookMK 0.030 0.020 2.354 0.039 0.048 0.668 
Numsegment + -0.096** 0.045 4.477 0.055* 0.030 3.333 
Numfrgnseg + -0.314** 0.139 5.140 0.143 0.222 0.413 
Frgnsegrev + -0.014 0.083 0.029 -0.061 0.038 2.518 
Control for year and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 16,382 16,382 
No. of clusters 3,317 2,268 
Adjusted R2 18.54% 16.87% 
Percent classified correctly 72.90% 74.40% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 2260.79*** 1462.79*** 
***, **, *indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 25 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
for Small and Large Firm Sample 
This table presents results from the logistic regression estimating the likelihood of 
non-local auditor-client relationship for subsample of small and large firms. The 
first regression includes observation with Size smaller than 3.908 (the lower 
quartile). The second regression includes observationwith Size larger than 
7.305(the upper quartile). The regression is: 
NonLocal = ~o + ~1NumBign_MSA + ~2NumnonBign_MSA + ~3NumExp_MSA + 
~d,everage + ~5Loss+ ~6GoingConcem + ~1ROA+ ~sSOX302 + ~9Nafeeratio + 
~ 10Audiifee +~11BigN + ~12 Officenatexp + ~13/nstOwner + ~ 1,JndepentDT + 
~ 15BookMK+ ~1~umsegment + ~nNumfrgnseg + ~1sFrgnsegrev +Industry and year 
dummies+ 0 
NonLocal equals 1 if the auditor and the client are not in the same city or the same 
MSA and are farther away from each other more than 100 miles driving distance by 
Google Map. NumBigN_MSA =Number of Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or 
Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA = 
Number of non-Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas 
where the firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA =Number of non-Big 4 auditors in the 
Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. 
NumExp_MSA =Number of top ten auditor offices with industry specialization at 
national level in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is 
located. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. Loss = 1 if the firm reported net loss 
in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. GoingConcem = 1 if the firm received a going 
concern audit opinion in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. ROA = net income/total 
assets. SOX302 = 1 if the firm reported internal control weaknesses under Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 Section 302, and 0 otherwise. Nafeeratio = natural log of total non-
audit fees/total audit fees. Audiifee = natural log of total audit fees/total assets. BigN = 
1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the 
auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise. InstOwner = 
total number of common shares owned by institutional investors/total number of 
common shares outstanding. IndepentDT = total number of independent directors 
/total number of directors. BookMK =book value of owners' equity/ market value of 
the firm. Numsegment = number of geographic segments. Numfrgnseg = number of 
foreign segments. Frgnsegrev = natural log of total revenues from foreign segments. 
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TABLE26 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship For 
Full Sample Including Observations outside MSAs 
Variables Predicted 
sign Coeff. Std Error Chi-Sguare 
Intercept -1.460 0.961 2.307 
A vailabilitl: of local auditors 
NumBigN_MSA -0.220*** 0.019 140.437 
NumNonBigN_MSA -0.002* 0.001 2.759 
NumExp_MSA -0.142*** 0.035 16.057 
Risk 
Leverage + -0.026* 0.014 3.664 
Loss + 0.176*** 0.043 16.414 
Going Concern + 0.503*** 0.066 58.403 
ROA -0.054*** 0.016 11.977 
SOX302 + 0.158** 0.064 6.118 
Fee 
NAfeeratio -0.442*** 0.062 51.097 
Auditfee 2.241*** 0.655 11.707 
Control variables 
BigN +1- -0.675*** 0.071 91.544 
Officenatexp +1- -0.074 0.186 0.158 
Ins tOwner -12.017*** 2.857 17.686 
lndepentDT -0.085 0.112 0.582 
Size +1- -0.047** 0.022 4.681 
BookMK 0.020* 0.015 1.934 
Numsegment + -0.025 0.019 1.610 
Numfrgnseg + -0.140* 0.085 2.756 
Frgnsegrev + 0.007 0.021 0.114 
Control for ~ear and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 66,718 
No. of clusters 9,402 
Adjusted R2 17.15% 
Percent classified correctly 73.70% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 7249.47*** 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed 
tests). 
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TABLE 26 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Non-Local Auditor-client Relationship 
For Full Sample Including Observations outside MSAs 
This table presents results from the logistic regression estimating the likelihood of non-
local auditor-client relationship for the full sample including all observations that are 
located outside an MSA. The regression is: 
NonLocal = ~o + ~~NumBign_MSA + ~zNumnonBign_MSA + ~3NumExp_MSA + 
~~everage + ~sLoss+ ~6GoingConcem + ~1ROA+ ~sSOX302 + ~9Nafeeratio + 
~wAudiifee +~11BigN + ~12 Officenatexp + ~13lnstOwner + ~ 1JndepentDT + 
~1sBookMK + ~~~umsegment + ~17Numjrgnseg + ~1sFrgnsegrev + Industry and year 
dummies+ s 
NonLocal equals 1 if the auditor and the client are not in the same city or the same 
MSA and are farther away from each other more than 100 miles driving distance by 
Google Map. NumBigN_MSA =Number of Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or 
Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA =Number 
of non-Big 4 auditors in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the 
firm is located. NumnonBigN_MSA =Number of non-Big 4 auditors in the 
Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is located. 
NumExp_MSA =Number of top ten auditor offices with industry specialization at 
national level in the Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Areas where the firm is 
located. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. Loss = 1 if the firm reported net loss 
in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. GoingConcem = 1 if the firm received a going 
concern audit opinion in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. ROA = net income/total 
assets. SOX302 = 1 if the firm reported internal control weaknesses under Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 Section 302, and 0 otherwise. Nafeeratio = natural log of total non-
audit fees/total audit fees. Audiifee = natural log of total audit fees/total assets. BigN = 
1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the 
auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise. InstOwner = 
total number of common shares owned by institutional investors/total number of 
common shares outstanding. IndepentDT = total number of independent directors /total 
number of directors. BookMK =book value of owners' equity/ market value of the firm. 
Numsegment = number of geographic segments. Numfrgnseg = number of foreign 
segments. Frgnsegrev = natural log of total revenues from foreign segments. 
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Table 27 
Logistic Reg~ssions on t!J.e Likelihood of Restatement for Full Sample 
Parameter Estimate Standard Chi- Estimate Standard Chi-
Error Square Error Square 
Misstatement Restatement 
Intercept -2.763*** 0.362 58.409 -2.037*** 0.416 24.010 
Local -0.181*** 0.031 33.943 -0.179*** 0.037 23.313 
Size 0.056*** 0.008 56.536 0.019** 0.009 4.488 
Leverage 0.015 0.011 1.873 0.015 0.012 1.584 
BookMK 0.027*** 0.010 7.184 0.014 0.012 1.390 
ROA -0.042*** 0.013 10.107 -0.037** 0.015 6.163 
InstOwner -7.759*** 1.613 23.141 -2.605 1.947 1.790 
...... 
IndepentDT -0.320*** 0.060 28.219 -0.665*** 0.076 N 76.100 00 
BigN 0.119*** 0.032 13.561 0.164*** 0.039 18.145 
Officenatexp 0.307*** 0.061 25.030 0.298*** 0.074 16.381 
Control for year and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 65,525 65,525 
No. of restatements 9,274 5,820 
Adjusted R2 5.48% 4.83% 
c 63.80% 64.40% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 2034.73*** 1442.80*** 
***,**,*indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
-N \0 
TABLE 27 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Restatement for Full Sample 
This table presents the results from the logistic regressions estimating the likelihood of restatement for full sample. The 
first regression estimates the likelihood of misstatement or subsequent restatement. The second regression estimates the 
likelihood of restatement during the observation year. The model is: 
Restatement= ~o + fJ1Local + fJ2Size + f33Leverage + fJ4Bookmk + fJsROA + fJ@nstowner + f37lndepentdt + fJsBigN + 
/]90!ficenatexp + e 
Local = 1 if the auditor and the client are in the same city or the same MSA or located within 100 miles driving distance by 
Google Map from each other. Size = natural log of total assets. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. BookMK =book 
value of owners' equity/ market value of the fum. ROA = net income/total assets. InstOwner = total number of common 
shares owned by institutional investors/total number of common shares outstanding. IndepentDT = total number of 
independent directors /total number of directors. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. 
Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise. 
TABLE28 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Issuing a Going Concern Report for Full 
Sam le 
Parameter Estimate Standard Chi-Square 
Error 
Intercept -3.261 6.687 0.238 
Local -0.434*** 0.046 87.819 
Zscore 0.005*** 0.001 33.881 
Loss 1.279*** 0.057 507.855 
Leverage 0.378*** 0.028 181.636 
Mkcap -0.511 *** 0.018 782.882 
Cash -0.022 0.025 0.767 
CurrentRT -0.221 *** 0.011 409.071 
ROA -0.506*** 0.028 333.563 
REVT -0.362*** 0.016 519.696 
OANCF 0.001 *** 0.000 10.114 
BigN 0.264*** 0.055 22.922 
Officenatexp 0.216 0.192 1.264 
Control for _year and industry fixed effect 
No. of obs 51,001 
No. of going concern 6,024 
Adjusted R2 63.36% 
c 95.20% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 20207.70*** 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
This table presents the results from the logistic regression predicting the likelihood of a going 
concern audit opinion for full sample. The model is: 
Going_concern = 13a + l31Local + l32Zscore + l33Loss + l3~everage + l3sMkcap + l36Cash + 
l37CurrentRT + l38ROA + l39REVT + l3100ANCF + l3nBigN +l3n0fficenatexp + c 
Going_ concern = 1 if the audit opinion is a going concern opinion, and 0 otherwise. Local = 1 if 
the auditor and the client are in the same city or the same MSA or located within 100 miles 
driving distance by Google Map from each other. Zscore is Altman's Z Score predicting the 
likelihood of bankruptcy. Loss = 1 if the firm reported net loss in the previous year, and 0 
otherwise. Leverage= total liabilities/total assets. Size= natural log of total assets. MKcap = 
natural log of the firm's market value. Cash = natural log of cash. CurrentRT = total current 
assets/total current liabilities. ROA =net income/total assets. REVT =natural log of total 
revenues. OANCF = cash flows from operating activities. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the 
Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at 
national level, and 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE29 
Likelihood of Issuing a Going Concern Opinion with Type I Error for Full Sample 
Panel A: Bankruptcy 
Parameter Estimate Standard Chi-Square Estimate Standard 
Error Error 
Chi-Square 
Bankruptcy within 1 year Bankruptcy within 2 years 
Intercept -4.317*** 0.188 530.112 -3 .447*** 0.138 622.233 
Local 0.137 0.171 0.640 0.347*** 0.134 6.658 
Zscore -0.002 0.001 1.463 0.000 0.001 0.166 
Sales 0.393*** 0.037 112.938 0.284*** 0.028 104.878 
Exch -1.300*** 0.312 17.406 -1.510*** 0.290 27.186 
BigN 0.450** 0.176 6.519 0.470*** 0.133 12.544 
Officenatexp_ 1.019** 0.428 5.681 1.097*** 0.375 8.576 
No. of obs 4,889 4,889 
No. of bankruptcy 225 383 
Adjusted R2 17.47% 14.57% 
c 80.10% 75.70% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 273.56 *** 310.69 *** 
...... 
w 
N 
TABLE 29 (continued) 
Likelihood of Issuing a Going Concern Opinion with Type I Error for Full Sample 
Panel B: Bankruptcy and delist 
Parameter Estimate Standard Chi-Square Estimate Standard 
Error Error 
Chi-Square 
Bankruptcy and delist within 1 year Bankruptcy and delist within 2 years 
Intercept -3.636*** 0.150 586.780 -3.002*** 0.118 644.267 
Local 0.233 0.144 2.634 0.392*** 0.118 11 .114 
Zscore 0.002 0.002 1.523 0.003** 0.001 5.999 
Sales 0.308*** 0.030 105.509 0.247*** 0.024 105.534 
Exch -1.562*** 0.300 27.111 -1.860*** 0.284 42.762 
BigN 0.587*** 0.142 17.038 0.625*** 0.114 30.048 
Officenatexe. 0.900** 0.393 5.238 0.929** 0.362 6.584 
No. of obs 4,889 4,889 
No. of bankruptcy 331 524 
Adjusted R2 16.78% 16.64% 
c 79.10% 76.90% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 331.54 *** 419.21 *** 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
This table presents the results from the logistic regressions estimating the likelihood of bankruptcy for observations with going concern 
opinion in the full sample. Panel A predicts the likelihood of bankruptcy and Panel B predicts the likelihood of bankruptcy and 
delisting. The model is: 
Bankrupt= {30 + f31Local + f32Zscore + f33Sales + f34Exch + fJ5BigN+fJ60fficenatexp + c 
Bankrupt= 1 if the firm went bankrupt or was delisted within 1 or 2 years after receiving a going concern audit opinion, and 0 
otherwise. Local = 1 if the auditor and the client are in the same city or the same MSA or located within 100 miles driving distance 
from each other. Zscore is Altman's Z Score predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy. Sales,; natural log of sales. Exch = 1 if the firm 
is listed on the New York or American Stock Exchange, and o otherwise. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 
otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise. 
...... 
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TABLE30 
Likelihood of Issuing a Going Concern Opinion with 'J:y~ II Error for Full Sample 
Parameter Estimate Standard Chi-Square Estimate Standard Chi-Square 
Error Error 
Bankruptcy Bankruptcy and delisted 
Intercept 0.814*** 0.274 8.843 . 0.258 0.213 
Local 0.033 0.215 0.024 -0.195 0.178 
Zscore -0.028*** 0.009 10.097 -0.048*** 0.008 
Sales -0.194*** 0.049 16.046 -0.104*** 0.038 
Exch 0.435 0.378 1.324 0.421 0.366 
BigN -0.103 0.204 0.257 -0.099 0.157 
Officenatexe. 0.075 0.499 0.022 0.163 0.458 
No. of obs 618 931 
No. of going concern reports 324 429 
Adjusted R2 16.74% 15.31% 
c 71.10% 73.00% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 82.87*** 113.28*** 
***,**,*indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
This table presents the results from the logistic regressions estimating the likelihood of going concern opinion prior to the 
bankruptcy or delisting for observations in the full sample that went bankrupt or were delisted. The model is: 
Going_ Concern= flo+ fJ1Local + fJ2Zscore + fJ3Sales + {J4Exch + fJ5BigN+fJ6officenatexp + E: 
1.476 
1.191 
31.951 
7.632 
1.324 
0.401 
0.127 
Local= 1 if the auditor and the client are in the same city or the same MSA or located within 100 miles driving distance from 
each other. Zscore is Altman's Z Score predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy. Sales = natural log of sales. Exch = 1 if the firm 
is listed on the New York or American Stock Exchange, and o otherwise. BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 
0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE31 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Restatement for Non-local Non-Big 4 Sample 
Parameter Estimate Standard Chi-Square Estimate 
Error 
Standard Chi-Square 
Error 
Subsequent restatement Current restatement 
Intercept -2.864*** 1.108 6.681 -1.170 0.772 2.297 
Localavail 0.270*** 0.076 12.671 0.219** 0.086 6.484 
Size 0.031 0.024 1.636 0.059** 0.027 4.933 
Leverage -0.031 * 0.018 3.154 -0.034* 0.020 2.976 
BookMK -0.001 0.023 0.001 0.008 0.027 0.085 
ROA -0.046** 0.020 5.041 -0.077*** 0.023 11.526 
Ins tOwner -21.151 *** 5.630 14.114 -17.413*** 6.269 7.715 
IndepentDT -1.875 * 0.965 3.779 -0.933 0.809 1.330 
Control for year and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 6,280 6,280 
No. of restatements 943 696 
Adjusted R2 6.44% 5.88% 
c 65.60% 65.30% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 235.17*** 188.13*** 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests) . 
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TABLE 31 (continued) 
Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Restatement 
This table presents the results from the logistic regressions estimating the likelihood of restatement for non-local non-Big 
4 sample. The first regression estimates the likelihood of misstatement or subsequent restatement. The second regression 
estimates the likelihood of restatement during the observation year. The model is: 
Restatement= Po+ fJzLocalavail + fJ2Size + f33Leverage + f34Bookmk + f3sROA + f36Instowner + f37lndepentdt + f3sBigN 
+ fJgOfficenatexp + c 
· Localavail is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the number of non-Big 4 auditors in the MSA is greater than 
8 (median number of non- Big 4 auditor in the non-local sample), and takes the value zero otherwise. Size= natural log of 
total assets. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. BookMK =book value of owners' equity/ market value of the firm. 
ROA = net income/total assets. InstOwner = total number of common shares owned by institutional investors/total 
number of common shares outstanding. IndepentDT = total number of independent directors /total number of directors. 
BigN = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Officenatexp = 1 if the auditor office is the industry 
specialist at national level, and 0 otherwise. 
TABLE 32 
Audit Quality for Non-local Observations with Very Far Auditor-Client Distance 
Panel A: Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Misstatement for Non-local Sample 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Chi-Square 
Intercept -2.832** 1.109 6.521 
Far 0.303*** 0.082 13.624 
Size 0.032 0.024 1.741 
Leverage -0.032* 0.018 3.360 
BookMK 0.002 0.023 0.006 
ROA -0.042** 0.020 4.349 
InstOwner -21.138*** 5.637 14.064 
/ndepentDT -1.871 * 0.963 3.776 
Control for ~ear and industry fixed effect 
No. of observations 6,280 
No. of restatements 943 
Max-rescaled R2 6.46% 
c 65.70% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sguare 235.79*** 
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TABLE 32 (continued) 
Audit Quality for Non-local Observations with Very Far Auditor-Client Distance 
Panel B: Logistic Regressions on the Likelihood of Issuing a Going Concern Report 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Chi-Square 
Intercept 
Far 
Zscore 
Loss 
Leverage 
Mkcap 
Cash 
CurrentRT 
ROA 
REVT 
OANCF 
No. of obs 
No. of going concern 
Adjusted R2 
c 
-1.439*** 
0.565*** 
0.000 
1.105*** 
0.361 *** 
-0.003*** 
-0.099*** 
-0.064*** 
-0.311 *** 
-0.006*** 
-0.040*** 
5,008 
2,142 
59.35% 
91.20% 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 2921.29*** 
0.118 148.216 
0.085 44.673 
0.001 0.127 
0.110 100.813 
0.042 74.255 
0.001 24.944 
0.013 62.921 
0.011 35.213 
0.036 73.581 
0.001 31.644 
0.007 36.690 
***,**,*indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests) . 
This table presents the logistic regression of the likelihood of misstatement and going-concern 
report within the non-local subsample. The experiment variable, Far, equals 1 if the distance 
between the auditor and the client is farther than 905 miles (the 75th percentile of the distance 
in the non-local sample), and 0 otherwise. 
In Panel A, the restatement model is 
Restatement= ~o + fJ1Far + fJ2Size + {J3Leverage + fJJ)ookmk + fJ5ROA + fJ6/nstowner + 
fhlndepentdt + &; 
Size = natural log of total assets. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. BookMK = book value 
of owners' equity/ market value of the firm. ROA = net income/total assets. lnstOwner =total 
number of common shares owned by institutional investors/total number of common shares 
outstanding. IndepentDT =total number of independent directors /total number of directors 
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TABLE 32 (continued) 
Audit Quality for Non-local Observations with Very Far Auditor-Client Distance 
In Panel B, the model is Going_concern = 13o+ j31Far + j32Zscore + j33Loss + j3.¢Leverage + 
j3sMkcap + j36Cash + j37CurrentRT + 13sROA + j39Revt + j3100ANCF+ c; 
Going_concern = 1 if the audit opinion is a going concern opinion,and 0 otherwise. Zscore is 
Altman's Z Score predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy. Loss = 1 if the firm reported net loss in 
the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. Size = natural log of 
total assets. MKcap = natural log of the firm's market value. Cash = natural log of cash. 
CurrentRT = total current assets/total current liabilities. ROA = net income/total assets. REVT = 
natural log of total revenues. OANCF = cash flows from operating activities. 
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